Liquidity Management
Gamma
DeFiFoundry
50,000 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

There is no check for the minimum and maximum deposit amounts in PerpetualVault::setMinMaxDepositAmount.

ckcodemax

Summary

In the PerpetualVault::setMinMaxDepositAmount, there is no check if the _minDepositAmount or the _maxDepositAmount is greater than zero. There is also no check if _minDepositAmountis less than the specified 1000USDC.There is also no check if the _maxDepositAmount is greater than the 100000USDC.

Vulnerability Details

A malicious owner may set the PerpetualVault::setMinMaxDepositAmount to any amounts they want since the function doesn't hold checks for the values defined by the admin.

Impact

Users can deposit any amount, ranging from zero to infinity. The depositor will have a very high stake in the protocol and possibly giving the user the ability to manipulate the protocol.

Proof of Code:

Please note that this a fork test. We need to use a fork url for arbitrum. You can get a fork url from [alchemy](https://www.alchemy.com/).

The test won't run if you do not use a fork url. To run the test, open a new terminal and run,

forge test --fork-url $YOUR_ARBITRUM_RPC_URL test/PerpetualVault.t.sol --mt testFuzzMinMaxValueCanBeAnyNumber -vvv

Add the following lines of code to the test/PerpetualVault.t.sol file. This fuzz test will revert because one or more of these conditions won't be met after a few runs.

function testFuzzMinMaxValueCanBeAnyNumber(uint256 min, uint256 max) public {
uint256 minDepositAmountAdmin = 1000;
uint256 maxDepositAmountAdmin = 100000;
address owner = PerpetualVault(vault).owner();
vm.startPrank(owner);
PerpetualVault(vault).setMinMaxDepositAmount(min, max);
uint256 minDepositAmount = PerpetualVault(vault).minDepositAmount();
uint256 maxDepositAmount = PerpetualVault(vault).maxDepositAmount();
vm.stopPrank();
​
assert(minDepositAmount + maxDepositAmount != 0);
assert(minDepositAmount >= minDepositAmountAdmin);
assert(maxDepositAmount <= maxDepositAmountAdmin);
assert(minDepositAmount != 0);
assert(maxDepositAmount != 0);
assert(minDepositAmount < maxDepositAmount);
}
​

Recommendations

The issue stems from [PerpetualVault::setMinMaxDepositAmount](https://github.com/CodeHawks-Contests/2025-02-gamma/blob/84b9da452fc84762378481fa39b4087b10bab5e0/contracts/PerpetualVault.sol#L717)

The solution is to add a check for min and max values.

​
//declare the values restrictions as state variables
+ uint256 public constant minDepositAmountAdmin = 1000;
+ uint256 public constant maxDepositAmountAdmin = 100000;
​
function setMinMaxDepositAmount(uint256 _minDepositAmount, uint256 _maxDepositAmount) external onlyOwner {
+ require(_minDepositAmount >= minDepositAmountAdmin && _maxDepositAmount <= maxDepositAmountAdmin, "_minDepositAmount or _maxDepositAmount not set correctly");
minDepositAmount = _minDepositAmount;
maxDepositAmount = _maxDepositAmount;
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 9 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Informational or Gas

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point.

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

n0kto Lead Judge 9 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Informational or Gas

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point.

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

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