PerpetualVault.sol::_cancelFlow()
The _cancelFlow() function in PerpetualVault.sol performs external token transfers before updating the state. This creates a reentrancy vulnerability that attackers could exploit to withdraw funds multiple times.
safeTransfer() is called before delete depositInfo[depositId], allowing an attacker to reenter the contract and manipulate depositInfo before deletion.
POC
The attacker could call cancelFlow() repeatedly before state variables are updated, draining the vault.
Fund Theft: Attackers can withdraw more than they are entitled to.
Denial of Service: Reentrancy attacks could lock the contract and prevent legitimate withdrawals.
Manual Review
Use Reentrancy Guard (nonReentrant)
Apply Checks-Effects-Interactions Pattern
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Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point.
There is no real proof, concrete root cause, specific impact, or enough details in those submissions. Examples include: "It could happen" without specifying when, "If this impossible case happens," "Unexpected behavior," etc. Make a Proof of Concept (PoC) using external functions and realistic parameters. Do not test only the internal function where you think you found something.
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