The contract relies on the L2 sequencer uptime feed to ensure the sequencer is operational. If the sequencer is down or the feed is delayed, the contract may fail to validate prices correctly.
This vulnerability can be found in the lines of code below;
Proof of Concept (PoC):
The sequencer goes down, but the uptime feed is delayed in reporting this.
The contract continues to validate prices based on outdated data, leading to incorrect executions.
Example:
(, int256 answer, uint256 startedAt, , ) = sequencerUptimeFeed.latestRoundData();
require(answer == 0, "sequencer is down");
require(block.timestamp - startedAt > GRACE_PERIOD_TIME, "Grace period is not over");
If the sequencer is down but the feed is delayed, the contract may fail to detect the issue.
Sequencer downtime could lead to incorrect price validation and protocol instability
Deepseek
Implement a fallback mechanism to pause operations if the sequencer is down.
Use multiple sequencer uptime feeds to reduce reliance on a single source.
Add a grace period for sequencer recovery to ensure accurate price validation.
Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point.
There is no real proof, concrete root cause, specific impact, or enough details in those submissions. Examples include: "It could happen" without specifying when, "If this impossible case happens," "Unexpected behavior," etc. Make a Proof of Concept (PoC) using external functions and realistic parameters. Do not test only the internal function where you think you found something.
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
This is your time to appeal against judgements on your submissions.
Appeals are being carefully reviewed by our judges.