The protocol lacks a pause/unpause mechanism. Making it vulnerable to critical failures, exploits or unforeseen issues. Without ability to pause operations, the system can not mitigate ongoing attacks, halt faulty logic, or respond to external failures.
NOTE: Although, the deposit function only has the paused but other critical functions that users interact with are missing the pause/unpause mechanism (e.g., withdraw)
Observe that no functions check for a paused state before executing trades, deposits, or withdrawals.
Simulate an external dependency failure (e.g., GMX downtime ) and note that the system continue operating under incorrect conditions
Attempts to manually stop execution during an emergency
— There is no way to halt user interactions
This exploit has happened to some several protocols in the past of not implementing the pause and unpause mechanism.
No emergency shutdown
Uncontrolled execution during failures
Manual Review
Introduce a pause/ unpause mechanism, controlled by a governance multisig or emergency admin.
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