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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

Lack of Access Control in `GmxProxy.refundExecutionFee`

Summary

The refundExecutionFee function in the GmxProxy contract allows any address set as perpVault to refund ETH, posing a risk if the perpVault is compromised.

Vulnerability Details

The refundExecutionFee function allows the perpVault address to refund ETH to any recipient address. If the perpVault contract is compromised or maliciously manipulated, it can call this function to transfer ETH from the GmxProxy contract to any address, leading to potential loss of ETH.

Root Cause:
The refundExecutionFee function lacks robust access control, allowing any address set as perpVault to refund ETH. If the perpVault contract is compromised, it poses a risk of potential loss of ETH due to unauthorized transfers.

Proof of Concept:

  1. Code Analysis:

    function refundExecutionFee(address receipient, uint256 amount) external {
    require(msg.sender == perpVault, "invalid caller");
    payable(receipient).transfer(amount);
    }
  2. Example Scenario:

    • Compromised perpVault:

      • Assume the perpVault contract is compromised by an attacker.

      • The attacker can call the refundExecutionFee function with their address as the recipient and a large amount of ETH.

    • Unauthorized ETH Transfer:

      • The refundExecutionFee function transfers the specified amount of ETH to the attacker's address.

      • This results in a loss of ETH from the GmxProxy contract.

  3. Unit Test:

    function test_RefundExecutionFee() external {
    address attacker = makeAddr("attacker");
    address compromisedPerpVault = makeAddr("compromisedPerpVault");
    // Set the compromisedPerpVault as the perpVault
    GmxProxy(gmxProxy).setPerpVault(compromisedPerpVault, market);
    // Fund the GmxProxy contract with some ETH
    vm.deal(address(gmxProxy), 10 ether);
    // Attempt to refund ETH to the attacker's address
    vm.prank(compromisedPerpVault);
    GmxProxy(gmxProxy).refundExecutionFee(attacker, 5 ether);
    // Check the attacker's balance
    assertEq(attacker.balance, 5 ether);
    }

Impact

Potential loss of ETH if the perpVault contract is maliciously manipulated. This can result in unauthorized transfers of ETH from the GmxProxy contract to an attacker's address.

Tools Used
manual

Recommendations

To mitigate the risk of unauthorized ETH transfers, consider implementing additional access control mechanisms and security measures. One approach is to use a multi-signature wallet or a more secure access control mechanism for the perpVault address. Additionally, consider adding checks to ensure that the recipient address is authorized to receive the refund:

function refundExecutionFee(address receipient, uint256 amount) external {
require(msg.sender == perpVault, "invalid caller");
require(isAuthorizedRecipient(receipient), "unauthorized recipient");
payable(receipient).transfer(amount);
}
function isAuthorizedRecipient(address receipient) internal view returns (bool) {
// Implement logic to check if the recipient is authorized
return true; // Placeholder
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 9 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

Suppositions

There is no real proof, concrete root cause, specific impact, or enough details in those submissions. Examples include: "It could happen" without specifying when, "If this impossible case happens," "Unexpected behavior," etc. Make a Proof of Concept (PoC) using external functions and realistic parameters. Do not test only the internal function where you think you found something.

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