DeFiFoundry
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

`maxCallbackGasLimit` in GMX is not checked in the `PerpetualVault`

Summary

The setCallbackGasLimit function in the PerpetualVault contract does not validate the provided callbackGasLimit against the maxCallbackGasLimit defined in the GMX protocol. This omission could lead to failed transactions or unintended behavior when orders with excessive gas limits are created.

Code Snippet

PerpetualVault Implementation

function setCallbackGasLimit(uint256 _callbackGasLimit) external onlyOwner {
callbackGasLimit = _callbackGasLimit;
}

GMX Validation Logic

function validateCallbackGasLimit(DataStore dataStore, uint256 callbackGasLimit) internal view {
uint256 maxCallbackGasLimit = dataStore.getUint(Keys.MAX_CALLBACK_GAS_LIMIT);
if (callbackGasLimit > maxCallbackGasLimit) {
revert Errors.MaxCallbackGasLimitExceeded(callbackGasLimit, maxCallbackGasLimit);
}
}

Vulnerability Details

The setCallbackGasLimit function in PerpetualVault lacks validation to ensure that the provided callbackGasLimit does not exceed the maxCallbackGasLimit defined in the GMX protocol. As a result, if an owner sets a callbackGasLimit higher than maxCallbackGasLimit, transactions involving this limit will revert during execution, leading to potential disruptions in the protocol's functionality.

Impact

Failed Transactions: Orders created with a callbackGasLimit exceeding maxCallbackGasLimit will revert, causing transaction failures.

Tools Used

Manual code review.

Recommendations

To mitigate this issue, the setCallbackGasLimit function should include validation against maxCallbackGasLimit. Here is the recommended fix:

function setCallbackGasLimit(uint256 _callbackGasLimit) external onlyOwner {
uint256 maxCallbackGasLimit = dataStore.getUint(Keys.MAX_CALLBACK_GAS_LIMIT);
if (_callbackGasLimit > maxCallbackGasLimit) {
revert Errors.MaxCallbackGasLimitExceeded(_callbackGasLimit, maxCallbackGasLimit);
}
callbackGasLimit = _callbackGasLimit;
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 9 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

n0kto Lead Judge 9 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

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