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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

Hardcoded Magic Numbers [Reduced Maintainability & Flexibility]

Summary

Multiple instances of magic numbers are found throughout the codebase instead of using named constants, making the code less maintainable and more prone to errors during updates.

Vulnerability Details

Magic numbers are found in several locations:

// GmxProxy.sol
function initialize() {
minEth = 0.002 ether;
}
function getExecutionGasLimit() {
uint256 oraclePriceCount = 5;
}

These values:

  1. Lack clear documentation explaining their significance

  2. Are difficult to update consistently if changes are needed

  3. Make code less readable and maintainable

Impact

  • Reduced code maintainability

  • Increased risk of errors during updates

  • Lack of clarity about value significance

  • Potential inconsistencies if values need to be updated

Recommendations

Define constants with clear names and documentation:

// GmxProxy.sol
contract GmxProxy {
// Minimum ETH required for operation (2000000000000000 wei = 0.002 ETH)
uint256 public constant MIN_REQUIRED_ETH = 0.002 ether;
// Maximum number of oracle prices to fetch
uint256 public constant MAX_ORACLE_PRICES = 5;
function initialize() {
minEth = MIN_REQUIRED_ETH;
}
function getExecutionGasLimit() {
uint256 oraclePriceCount = MAX_ORACLE_PRICES;
}
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 9 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Informational or Gas

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point.

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

n0kto Lead Judge 9 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Informational or Gas

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point.

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

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