Price Validation Threshold Too Strict
Summary
The price validation logic in the KeeperProxy contract checks if the price deviation from the Chainlink price feed is within a certain threshold (priceDiffThreshold[token]). However, the validation threshold might be too strict, leading to false rejections of valid price updates.
Vulnerability Details
The function
_check()uses the formula:require(_absDiff(price, chainLinkPrice.toUint256()) * BPS / chainLinkPrice.toUint256() < priceDiffThreshold[token], "price offset too big");
The condition compares the price deviation with a strict threshold defined by
priceDiffThreshold[token], which could be too small in highly volatile markets.False rejection of valid price updates could occur during times of high volatility or network delays when prices deviate slightly, but still within acceptable bounds for a real-world scenario.
Impact
False Rejection: In fast-moving markets, legitimate price fluctuations might be rejected due to the strict threshold, leading to actions being prevented that should be executed.
Market Disruption: If price changes are consistently rejected, it can affect the flow of trades, liquidations, or any other market-dependent operations, causing market inefficiencies.
Tools Used
Manual Code Review
Recommendations
Relax the price deviation threshold, or introduce dynamic threshold adjustments based on market conditions, volatility, and time.
Implement more flexible price validation mechanisms that can adapt to varying market conditions, particularly in times of high volatility.
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Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers
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