Liquidity Management
Gamma
DeFiFoundry
50,000 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

Unauthorized Order Execution via Keeper Proxy

0x0107

Summary

The KeeperProxy contract allows external keepers to execute functions like run(), runNextAction(), and cancelFlow(), but it does not validate the caller’s authority over the targeted PerpetualVault instance. This could allow unauthorized actors to interfere with vault operations, potentially manipulating orders, liquidations, or position changes.

Vulnerability Details

In KeeperProxy.sol, the following functions allow any registered keeper to execute actions on any PerpetualVault instance:

function run(
address perpVault,
bool isOpen,
bool isLong,
MarketPrices memory prices,
bytes[] memory _swapData
) external onlyKeeper {
_validatePrice(perpVault, prices);
IPerpetualVault(perpVault).run(isOpen, isLong, prices, _swapData);
}
​
function runNextAction(address perpVault, MarketPrices memory prices, bytes[] memory _swapData) external onlyKeeper {
_validatePrice(perpVault, prices);
IPerpetualVault(perpVault).runNextAction(prices, _swapData);
}

No authentication for vault ownership

  • Any keeper registered in keepers[msg.sender] can control any vault, even if they are not associated with it.

  • A malicious keeper could manipulate positions, force liquidations, or disrupt trading strategies in other users’ vaults.

No mapping of keepers to specific vaults

  • The contract does not track which keepers belong to which vaults, allowing any keeper to execute commands on any vault.

PoC

  • Deploy KeeperProxy.sol and PerpetualVault.sol.

  • Register Keeper A for Vault X.

  • Deploy a separate Vault Y.

  • Keeper A calls run(Vault Y, true, true, prices, swapData) even though they are only supposed to manage Vault X.

  • The function executes successfully, proving unauthorized control over another vault.

Impact

  • Unauthorized control over other users' vaults

  • Potential forced liquidations or bad trades

  • Front-running risks if keepers exploit order execution priority

  • Malicious attacks on competing vaults

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommendations

Maintain a mapping of keepers to specific vaults rather than a global list.

Modify function signatures to validate the keeper’s access to the vault before executing:

modifier onlyAuthorizedKeeper(address perpVault) {
require(keepers[msg.sender] == perpVault, "Unauthorized keeper for this vault");
_;
}

Use AccessControl from OpenZeppelin to enforce stricter access.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

n0kto Lead Judge 7 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

Informational or Gas

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point.

Admin is trusted / Malicious keepers

Please read the CodeHawks documentation to know which submissions are valid. If you disagree, provide a coded PoC and explain the real likelihood and the detailed impact on the mainnet without any supposition (if, it could, etc) to prove your point. Keepers are added by the admin, there is no "malicious keeper" and if there is a problem in those keepers, that's out of scope. ReadMe and known issues states: " * System relies heavily on keeper for executing trades * Single keeper point of failure if not properly distributed * Malicious keeper could potentially front-run or delay transactions * Assume that Keeper will always have enough gas to execute transactions. There is a pay execution fee function, but the assumption should be that there's more than enough gas to cover transaction failures, retries, etc * There are two spot swap functionalies: (1) using GMX swap and (2) using Paraswap. We can assume that any swap failure will be retried until success. " " * Heavy dependency on GMX protocol functioning correctly * Owner can update GMX-related addresses * Changes in GMX protocol could impact system operations * We can assume that the GMX keeper won't misbehave, delay, or go offline. " "Issues related to GMX Keepers being DOS'd or losing functionality would be considered invalid."

Suppositions

There is no real proof, concrete root cause, specific impact, or enough details in those submissions. Examples include: "It could happen" without specifying when, "If this impossible case happens," "Unexpected behavior," etc. Make a Proof of Concept (PoC) using external functions and realistic parameters. Do not test only the internal function where you think you found something.

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