Summary
FeeCollector implements an emergency withdrawal function that transfers tokens to treasury. However, treasury keeps a separate accounting of token balances which is only updated when deposit is called. Because of that, the unaccounted tokens can never be withdrawn from the treasury.
Vulnerability Details
FeeCollector.sol:L269 implements the emergencyWithdraw function:
function emergencyWithdraw(address token) external override whenPaused {
if (!hasRole(EMERGENCY_ROLE, msg.sender)) revert UnauthorizedCaller();
if (token == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress();
uint256 balance;
if (token == address(raacToken)) {
balance = raacToken.balanceOf(address(this));
raacToken.safeTransfer(treasury, balance);
} else {
balance = IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this));
SafeERC20.safeTransfer(IERC20(token), treasury, balance);
}
emit EmergencyWithdrawal(token, balance);
}
However, Treasury has a separate deposit-withdraw logic that uses an internal accounting to keep track of token balances:
function deposit(address token, uint256 amount) external override nonReentrant {
if (token == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress();
if (amount == 0) revert InvalidAmount();
IERC20(token).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
_balances[token] += amount;
_totalValue += amount;
emit Deposited(token, amount);
}
function withdraw(
address token,
uint256 amount,
address recipient
) external override nonReentrant onlyRole(MANAGER_ROLE) {
if (token == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress();
if (recipient == address(0)) revert InvalidRecipient();
if (_balances[token] < amount) revert InsufficientBalance();
_balances[token] -= amount;
_totalValue -= amount;
IERC20(token).transfer(recipient, amount);
emit Withdrawn(token, amount, recipient);
}
Since the balances are not updated, withdrawal will be impossible and tokens will be stuck in the contract.
Impact
Tokens transferred will be forever lost.
Tools Used
Recommendations
Use the deposit(address token, uint256 amount)
function on the Treasury contract.