Summary
There is no state variable tracking the user's previously claimed reward amount in the StabilityPool. As a result, an attacker can repeatedly deposit and withdraw the same R token amount to drain RAAC tokens.
Vulnerability Details
User reward amount is calulated proportinal to user deposit in stabilitypool.
function calculateRaacRewards(address user) public view returns (uint256) {
uint256 userDeposit = userDeposits[user];
uint256 totalDeposits = deToken.totalSupply();
uint256 totalRewards = raacToken.balanceOf(address(this));
if (totalDeposits < 1e6) return 0;
return (totalRewards * userDeposit) / totalDeposits;
}
withdraw function there is no method implemented to prevent re-enter user who already claimed rewrads. This allows the user to continuously cycle funds (depositing and withdrawing) to drain the reward token.
function withdraw(uint256 deCRVUSDAmount) external nonReentrant whenNotPaused validAmount(deCRVUSDAmount) {
_update();
if (deToken.balanceOf(msg.sender) < deCRVUSDAmount) revert InsufficientBalance();
uint256 rcrvUSDAmount = calculateRcrvUSDAmount(deCRVUSDAmount);
uint256 raacRewards = calculateRaacRewards(msg.sender);
if (userDeposits[msg.sender] < rcrvUSDAmount) revert InsufficientBalance();
userDeposits[msg.sender] -= rcrvUSDAmount;
if (userDeposits[msg.sender] == 0) {
delete userDeposits[msg.sender];
}
deToken.burn(msg.sender, deCRVUSDAmount);
rToken.safeTransfer(msg.sender, rcrvUSDAmount);
if (raacRewards > 0) {
raacToken.safeTransfer(msg.sender, raacRewards);
}
emit Withdraw(msg.sender, rcrvUSDAmount, deCRVUSDAmount, raacRewards);
}
Impact
User able to steal the other users rewards.
Tools Used
Manual Review
Recommendations
Implement a method to prevent claim rewards user who already claimed.