Core Contracts
Regnum Aurum Acquisition Corp
HardhatReal World AssetsNFT
77,280 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

BaseGauge will be void of funds after emergency transfer by the admin through GaugeController::distributeRevenue()

056Security

Summary

The GaugeController Emergency Admin initiates distributeRevenue, which then calls _distributeToGauges to calculate rewards based on each gauge’s weight and type. However, the process does not transfer funds, causing notifyRewardAmount to revert continuously, leading to a Denial of Service (DoS) and preventing rewards from being distributed.

Vulnerability Details

Emergenct admin calls distributeRevenue ASAP

function distributeRevenue(
GaugeType gaugeType,
uint256 amount
) external onlyRole(EMERGENCY_ADMIN) whenNotPaused {
if (amount == 0) revert InvalidAmount();
uint256 veRAACShare = amount * 80 / 100; // 80% to veRAAC holders //@audit dali se distributira kum veraac holders rewardi
uint256 performanceShare = amount * 20 / 100; // 20% performance fee
revenueShares[gaugeType] += veRAACShare;
_distributeToGauges(gaugeType, veRAACShare);
emit RevenueDistributed(gaugeType, amount, veRAACShare, performanceShare);
}
function _distributeToGauges(
GaugeType gaugeType,
uint256 amount
) internal {
uint256 totalTypeWeight = 0;
uint256[] memory gaugeWeights = new uint256[](_gaugeList.length);
uint256 activeGaugeCount = 0;
​
// First pass: calculate total weight and store gauge weights
for (uint256 i = 0; i < _gaugeList.length; i++) {
address gauge = _gaugeList[i];
if (gauges[gauge].isActive && gauges[gauge].gaugeType == gaugeType) {
gaugeWeights[i] = gauges[gauge].weight;
totalTypeWeight += gaugeWeights[i];
activeGaugeCount++;
}
}
​
if (totalTypeWeight == 0 || activeGaugeCount == 0) return;
​
// Second pass: distribute rewards
for (uint256 i = 0; i < _gaugeList.length; i++) {
address gauge = _gaugeList[i];
if (gauges[gauge].isActive && gauges[gauge].gaugeType == gaugeType) {
uint256 gaugeShare = (amount * gaugeWeights[i]) / totalTypeWeight;
if (gaugeShare > 0) {
IGauge(gauge).notifyRewardAmount(gaugeShare);
}
}
}
}
function notifyRewardAmount(uint256 amount) external override onlyController updateReward(address(0)) {
if (amount > periodState.emission) revert RewardCapExceeded();
rewardRate = notifyReward(periodState, amount, periodState.emission, getPeriodDuration());
periodState.distributed += amount;
uint256 balance = rewardToken.balanceOf(address(this));
if (rewardRate * getPeriodDuration() > balance) {
revert InsufficientRewardBalance();
}
lastUpdateTime = block.timestamp;
emit RewardNotified(amount);
}

Whenever it calls notifyRewardAmount, the function checks the balance as if funds have already been transferred to the contract. However, since the contract is empty, the condition fails, causing a continuous revert and leading to a Denial of Service (DoS).

Impact

  • No rewards are distributed to gauges.

  • Core functionality is broken.

Tools Used

  • Manual review

Recommendations

  • Ensure that funds are transferred to the gauges before calling notifyRewardAmount.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

inallhonesty Lead Judge 7 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

GaugeController notifies gauges of rewards without transferring tokens in both distributeRewards and _distributeToGauges functions, breaking reward distribution

inallhonesty Lead Judge 7 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

GaugeController notifies gauges of rewards without transferring tokens in both distributeRewards and _distributeToGauges functions, breaking reward distribution

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