delegateBoost does not reset/deduct balances of the user that delegates so he can delegate to another address and effectively getting double the reward and vote boost for the same
balance of tokens .
malicious user can delegate his boosted amount to another address and his balance is not deducted , making it possible to delegate his amount and for him to use it aswell
gaming the protocol to receive double the rewards.
only delegation.amount is being recorded and checked if there is any delegated before this call with :
UserBoost storage delegation = userBoosts[msg.sender][to]; if (delegation.amount > 0) revert BoostAlreadyDelegated(); .
malicious user can use the same amount of tokens to receive double the rewards and voting power delegating it to another address of his own.
manual review
deduct balances of msg.sender with the corresponding amount that is being delegated.
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