Summary
`FeeCollector::emergencyWithdraw' permanently locks tokens in Treasury
Vulnerability Details
FeeCollector::emergencyWithdraw transfer its entire balance of token to Treasury contract.
function emergencyWithdraw(address token) external override whenPaused {
if (!hasRole(EMERGENCY_ROLE, msg.sender)) revert UnauthorizedCaller();
if (token == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress();
uint256 balance;
if (token == address(raacToken)) {
balance = raacToken.balanceOf(address(this));
@> raacToken.safeTransfer(treasury, balance);
} else {
balance = IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this));
@> SafeERC20.safeTransfer(IERC20(token), treasury, balance);
}
emit EmergencyWithdrawal(token, balance);
}
Treasury contract has deposit and withdraw function to receive and handle any token.
function deposit(address token, uint256 amount) external override nonReentrant {
if (token == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress();
if (amount == 0) revert InvalidAmount();
IERC20(token).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
@> _balances[token] += amount;
_totalValue += amount;
emit Deposited(token, amount);
}
function withdraw(
address token,
uint256 amount,
address recipient
) external override nonReentrant onlyRole(MANAGER_ROLE) {
if (token == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress();
if (recipient == address(0)) revert InvalidRecipient();
if (_balances[token] < amount) revert InsufficientBalance();
@> _balances[token] -= amount;
_totalValue -= amount;
IERC20(token).transfer(recipient, amount);
emit Withdrawn(token, amount, recipient);
}
Due to _balances per token tracking in deposit and withdraw, the Treasury can handle only tokens it receives using the deposit method. The Treasury can't move tokens received from the FeeCollector via direct ERC20::transfer.
Impact
emergencyWithdraw permanently locks tokens.
Tools Used
Recommendations
Edit FeeCollector::emergencyWithdraw function to: