The vote
function in the GaugeController
contract does not properly enforce the VOTE_DELAY
. The function is not using the lastVotTime
with repective to current timestamp to enfore the VOTE_DELAY
and prevent users from voting repeatedly within the delay period. This omission allows users to vote without respecting the intended delay, potentially enabling voting exploits and undermining the governance mechanism.
The vote
function is intended to allow veRAACToken holders to vote for gauges, with a VOTE_DELAY
to prevent rapid vote changes. While the contract includes VOTE_DELAY
constant, the vote
function does not use this to enforce the delay, thus the flawed logic does not effectively prevent rapid voting. The absence of a proper vote delay check allows users to repeatedly vote for different gauges or change their vote weights without respecting the intended VOTE_DELAY
. This can be used to manipulate gauge weights and unfairly influence reward distribution.
The failure to enforce the VOTE_DELAY
has the following negative consequences:
Vote Manipulation: Users can repeatedly vote for different gauges or change their vote weights without respecting the VOTE_DELAY
. This can be used to manipulate gauge weights and unfairly influence reward distribution.
Protocol Instability: The lack of enforced vote delay can lead to unpredictable and volatile gauge weight fluctuations, making it difficult for the protocol to function as intended.
Alice has veRAACTokens and wants to vote for a gauge.
Alice calls vote(gaugeAddress, weight1)
. The vote is successful.
Alice immediately calls vote(gaugeAddress, weight2)
.
The VOTE_DELAY
check is missing. It does not prevent the vote from proceeding.
The vote is successful again, even though the VOTE_DELAY
has not elapsed.
Alice can repeat steps 3-5 indefinitely, effectively bypassing the VOTE_DELAY
and potentially manipulating gauge weights.
Manual code review
The vote
function should be modified to include a proper check for the VOTE_DELAY
. The following should be added to the vote
function:
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