Emerygency Operation in TimelockController.sol does not have a delay as stated in the documentation
Summary
-
Emergency actions have 1-day delay -
This is not implemented in the contract even though there is a created state variable defined for 1 day.
Vulnerability Details
The code implementation fails to integrate the 1 day delay - expected to be shorter delay for emergency operations. The EMERGENCY_DELAY constant public variable was declared but never never considered as a condition for emergency operation on the TimelockController contract. Due to the relevance of this contract to the protocol governance system, this negligence could cause a possible governance manipulation when attacker takes over EMERGENCY_ROLE privileged functions.
Impact
Possible Governance Manipulation
Tools Used
Manual review
Recommendations
Consider EMERGENCY_*DELAY * variable in these functions:
scheduleEmergencyActions
executeEmergencyActions
Lead Judging Commences
TimelockController emergency actions bypass timelock by not enforcing EMERGENCY_DELAY, allowing immediate execution
TimelockController emergency actions bypass timelock by not enforcing EMERGENCY_DELAY, allowing immediate execution
Prize pool breakdown
Live
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
Appeals
This is your time to appeal against judgements on your submissions.
Appeals Review
Appeals are being carefully reviewed by our judges.