Submission Details
Severity:
Double application of `normalizedIncome` on balance in `RToken::calculateDustAmount` results in dust amounts being left in the protocol.
Vulnerability Details
The current implementation of RToken::calculateDustAmount incorrectly calculates the totalRealBalance by using currentTotalSupply with rayMul(normalizedIncome). This is because the totalSupply() function returns the actual supply of tokens, not the scaled supply.
function totalSupply() public view override(ERC20, IERC20) returns (uint256) {
@> return super.totalSupply().rayMul(ILendingPool(_reservePool).getNormalizedIncome());
}
function calculateDustAmount() public view returns (uint256) {
// Calculate the actual balance of the underlying asset held by this contract
uint256 contractBalance = IERC20(_assetAddress).balanceOf(address(this)).rayDiv(ILendingPool(_reservePool).getNormalizedIncome());
// Calculate the total real obligations to the token holders
@> uint256 currentTotalSupply = totalSupply(); // @audit returns actual totalSupply!!
// Calculate the total real balance equivalent to the total supply
// @audit this is repeating the process that has already happened in totalSupply!
@> uint256 totalRealBalance = currentTotalSupply.rayMul(ILendingPool(_reservePool).getNormalizedIncome());
return contractBalance <= totalRealBalance ? 0 : contractBalance - totalRealBalance;
}
So calculateDustAmount attempts to unscale the actual supply which has already been unscaled resulting in an overstated totalRealBalance. This skews the calculation (contractBalance - totalRealBalance) intended for transfer to the owner, leaving behind funds in the contract.
Although funds can be rescued using DebtToken::rescueToken by the reservePool, a patch is necessary for calculateDustAmount to serve its intended purpose.
Tools Used
Manual Review + Hardhat Testing
Proof-Of-Code
Place the following test in LendingPool.test.js,
it("test dust amounts not drained completely", async() => {
// Step1 - Simulate a situation where liquidityIndex goes > 1e27 which will
// eventually happen as users use protocol.
const depositAmount = ethers.parseEther("20");
const depositAmount2 = ethers.parseEther("30");
const depositAmount3 = ethers.parseEther("10");
await lendingPool.connect(user2).borrow(depositAmount2);
await debtToken.balanceOf(user2.address);
await lendingPool.connect(user3).borrow(depositAmount3);
await debtToken.balanceOf(user3.address);
await lendingPool.connect(user1).borrow(depositAmount);
await ethers.provider.send("evm_increaseTime", [5 * 24 * 60 * 60]); // 3 days
await ethers.provider.send("evm_mine", []);
await lendingPool.updateState();
// Step-2 - Simulate a situation where contractBalance > totalRealBalance
await crvusd.connect(user2).transfer(rToken.target, ethers.parseEther("100"));
const contractBalanceBeforeTransfer = await crvusd.balanceOf(rToken.target);
const totalRealBalanceNow = await rToken.totalSupply();
const expectedDustTransferred = contractBalanceBeforeTransfer - totalRealBalanceNow;
await lendingPool.connect(owner).transferAccruedDust(user1.address, contractBalanceBeforeTransfer);
const balanceNow = await crvusd.balanceOf(rToken.target);
const actualDustTransferred = contractBalanceBeforeTransfer - balanceNow;
expect(expectedDustTransferred).to.gt(actualDustTransferred);
})
Recommendations
Consider one of the following mitigations,
First Mitigation:
function calculateDustAmount() public view returns (uint256) {
// Calculate the actual balance of the underlying asset held by this contract
uint256 contractBalance = IERC20(_assetAddress).balanceOf(address(this)).rayDiv(ILendingPool(_reservePool).getNormalizedIncome());
// Calculate the total real obligations to the token holders
uint256 currentTotalSupply = totalSupply();
// Calculate the total real balance equivalent to the total supply
- uint256 totalRealBalance = currentTotalSupply.rayMul(ILendingPool(_reservePool).getNormalizedIncome());
- return contractBalance <= totalRealBalance ? 0 : contractBalance - totalRealBalance;
+ return contractBalance <= totalRealBalance ? 0 : contractBalance - currentTotalSupply;
}
Second Mitigation:
function calculateDustAmount() public view returns (uint256) {
// Calculate the actual balance of the underlying asset held by this contract
uint256 contractBalance = IERC20(_assetAddress).balanceOf(address(this)).rayDiv(ILendingPool(_reservePool).getNormalizedIncome());
// Calculate the total real obligations to the token holders
- uint256 currentTotalSupply = totalSupply();
+ uint256 currentTotalSupply = scaledTotalSupply();
// Calculate the total real balance equivalent to the total supply
uint256 totalRealBalance = currentTotalSupply.rayMul(ILendingPool(_reservePool).getNormalizedIncome());
return contractBalance <= totalRealBalance ? 0 : contractBalance - totalRealBalance;
}
Updates
Lead Judging Commences
inallhonesty 7 months ago
Submission Judgement Published Assigned finding tags:
RToken::calculateDustAmount incorrectly applies liquidity index, severely under-reporting dust amounts and permanently trapping crvUSD in contract
Prize pool breakdown
Total prize
77,280 USDC
nSLOC
3,86420
USDC / LOC
74,000
3,280
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