The protocol has a feature, which allows users to delegate their boost to another address.
This logic is facilitated by two functions: delegateBoost()
and removeBoostDelegation()
The delegateBoost()
only allows one delegation at a time and will revert until the amount
value is reset by calling removeBoostDelegation()
.
The issue is removeBoostDelegation()
can only be called by the recipient of the delegation.
If the recipient turns malicious, they can permanently DoS the delegator from using the delegation feature again by not calling removeBoostDelegation()
even after expiry.
Permanent DoS of delegateBoost()
for affected users
Manual Review
Modify removeBoostDelegation()
to be callable by both the delegator as well the recipient so that the delegation can be reset if the recipient goes missing or malicious.
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
This is your time to appeal against judgements on your submissions.
Appeals are being carefully reviewed by our judges.