Summary
The owner can not use accrued dust amount because it does not consider funds which are staked to curveVault.
Vulnerability Details
LendingPool.sol#_rebalanceLiquidity() function is as follows.
* @notice Rebalances liquidity between the buffer and the Curve vault to maintain the desired buffer ratio
*/
function _rebalanceLiquidity() internal {
if (address(curveVault) == address(0)) {
return;
}
uint256 totalDeposits = reserve.totalLiquidity;
uint256 desiredBuffer = totalDeposits.percentMul(liquidityBufferRatio);
uint256 currentBuffer = IERC20(reserve.reserveAssetAddress).balanceOf(reserve.reserveRTokenAddress);
if (currentBuffer > desiredBuffer) {
uint256 excess = currentBuffer - desiredBuffer;
_depositIntoVault(excess);
} else if (currentBuffer < desiredBuffer) {
uint256 shortage = desiredBuffer - currentBuffer;
_withdrawFromVault(shortage);
}
emit LiquidityRebalanced(currentBuffer, totalVaultDeposits);
}
As we can see above, only desired buffer remains to RToken.
But RToken.sol#calculateDustAmount() does not consider funds which are deposited to curveVault.
function calculateDustAmount() public view returns (uint256) {
uint256 contractBalance = IERC20(_assetAddress).balanceOf(address(this)).rayDiv(ILendingPool(_reservePool).getNormalizedIncome());
uint256 currentTotalSupply = totalSupply();
uint256 totalRealBalance = currentTotalSupply.rayMul(ILendingPool(_reservePool).getNormalizedIncome());
return contractBalance <= totalRealBalance ? 0 : contractBalance - totalRealBalance;
}
So the owner can not receive dust amounts.
Impact
So the owner can not receive dust amounts.
Tools Used
Manual review
Recommendations
Modify RToken.sol#calculateDustAmount() to consider funds which are deposited to curveVault.