User can delegate boost with holding no veRAAC tokens for the whole delegation duration.
When a user delegates boot to another address, protocol updates the delegation's expiry is set.
BoostController::delegateBoost()
However, protocol does not check the expiry against the unlock time of user's lock position. A malicious user delegates by using veRAAC token balance minted from an expired lock, then immediately withdraw from veRAACToken and get the veRAAC tokens burned, as a result, the user delegates for a period without holding any veRAAC tokens.
User delegates without holding veRAAC tokens during the delegation period.
Manual Review
When a user delegates, should check the delegation's exipry date against the user's lock unlock time.
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