The RAACMinter contract has a critical accounting error in its tick() function where it increases the excessTokens counter for tokens that are directly minted to the stability pool, leading to an inconsistency between recorded and actual excess token balances.
The RAACMinter contract has a critical accounting error in its tick() function where it increases the excessTokens counter for tokens that are directly minted to the stability pool, leading to an inconsistency between recorded and actual excess token balances.
However, in the tick() function:
The issue is that tick() increases excessTokens by amountToMint but those tokens are minted directly to the stability pool and never held by the contract.
excessTokens becomes inflated with tokens that don't exist in the contract
mintRewards() calculations become incorrect as they assume these tokens are available
This could lead to failed transfers in mintRewards() when trying to transfer tokens that don't exist
Manual Review
Remove the excessTokens increment in tick() since tokens are directly minted to stability pool
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