Core Contracts
Regnum Aurum Acquisition Corp
HardhatReal World AssetsNFT
77,280 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

NFT Price Staleness Attacks in LendingPool due to Block.timestamp

allamloqman

Summary :

The price oracle's use of block.timestamp for recording price updates allows miners to manipulate price staleness checks, enabling NFT withdrawals at manipulated timestamps that could harm protocol solvency.

Vulnerability Details :

the issue exist in :

function setHousePrice(uint256 _tokenId, uint256 _amount) external onlyOracle {
tokenToHousePrice[_tokenId] = _amount;
lastUpdateTimestamp = block.timestamp; // Vulnerable to miner manipulation
emit PriceUpdated(_tokenId, _amount);
}

so when a calling withdrawNFT function in LendingPool contract that calls the getNFTPrice

function as follow :

function withdrawNFT(uint256 tokenId) external nonReentrant whenNotPaused {
uint256 userDebt = user.scaledDebtBalance.rayMul(reserve.usageIndex);
uint256 collateralValue = getUserCollateralValue(msg.sender);
@> uint256 nftValue = getNFTPrice(tokenId); // Uses manipulatable timestamp
​
if (collateralValue - nftValue < userDebt.percentMul(liquidationThreshold)) {
revert WithdrawalWouldLeaveUserUnderCollateralized();
}
raacNFT.safeTransferFrom(address(this), msg.sender, tokenId);
}

any user can Get favorable timestamp for price update.

Impact :

  1. NFT price can return stale and the withdrawals are possible with manipulated timestamps this can make Protocol collateralization at risk and the Liquidation mechanisms compromised.

Tools Used :

Manuel review.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

inallhonesty Lead Judge 7 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

LendingPool::getNFTPrice or getPrimeRate doesn't validate timestamp staleness despite claiming to, allowing users to exploit outdated collateral values during price drops

inallhonesty Lead Judge 7 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

LendingPool::getNFTPrice or getPrimeRate doesn't validate timestamp staleness despite claiming to, allowing users to exploit outdated collateral values during price drops

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