Core Contracts
Regnum Aurum Acquisition Corp
HardhatReal World AssetsNFT
77,280 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Invalid

Users incur more gas when they deposit into the StabilityPool contract

iamephraim

Summary

Users incur more gas fee to pay for when they call deposit function. This is due to the double call to the tick function from the RAACMinter when users intend to deposit their RToken into their StabilityPool contract.

Vulnerability Details

Observe that when deposit is called by a user, it calls update and mintRAACRewards functions to mint RAAC rewards into the StabilityPool contract.

function deposit(uint256 amount) external nonReentrant whenNotPaused validAmount(amount) {
_update();
rToken.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
uint256 deCRVUSDAmount = calculateDeCRVUSDAmount(amount);
deToken.mint(msg.sender, deCRVUSDAmount);
​
userDeposits[msg.sender] += amount;
_mintRAACRewards();
​
emit Deposit(msg.sender, amount, deCRVUSDAmount);
}

The update and the mintRAACRewards function:

function _update() internal {
_mintRAACRewards();
}
​
function _mintRAACRewards() internal {
if (address(raacMinter) != address(0)) {
raacMinter.tick();
}
}

On tracing how tick works on the RAACMinter:

function tick() external nonReentrant whenNotPaused {
if (emissionUpdateInterval == 0 || block.timestamp >= lastEmissionUpdateTimestamp + emissionUpdateInterval) {
updateEmissionRate();
}
uint256 currentBlock = block.number;
uint256 blocksSinceLastUpdate = currentBlock - lastUpdateBlock;
if (blocksSinceLastUpdate > 0) {
uint256 amountToMint = emissionRate * blocksSinceLastUpdate;
​
if (amountToMint > 0) {
excessTokens += amountToMint;
lastUpdateBlock = currentBlock;
raacToken.mint(address(stabilityPool), amountToMint);
emit RAACMinted(amountToMint);
}
}
}

If all deposit happens before the emissionUpdateInterval, it skips the first if condition, get the difference in block since last update. If greater than zero, and the amountToMint is non-zero, it mints raacToken to stabilityPool contract.

The second call to tick from all deposit gets the blockSinceLadtUpdate but since this will be zero, it skips the rest of the function doing nothing. Users pay more gas for interacting with the StabilityPool:deposit function.

Impact

Incurs more gas for depositing RTokens into the StabilityPool.

Tools Used

Manual review.

Recommendations

Notice how this is only present in the deposit function. withdraw and liquidateBorrower only calls _update function for a single tick.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

inallhonesty Lead Judge 3 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity

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