Relevant Github link
https://github.com/Cyfrin/2025-02-raac/blob/89ccb062e2b175374d40d824263a4c0b601bcb7f/contracts/core/collectors/FeeCollector.sol#L479
https://github.com/Cyfrin/2025-02-raac/blob/89ccb062e2b175374d40d824263a4c0b601bcb7f/contracts/core/collectors/FeeCollector.sol#L199
Summary
Wrong variable is assigned to userRewards[user], makes the amount of reward lower than expected
Vulnerability Details
function claimRewards(address user) external override nonReentrant whenNotPaused returns (uint256) {
if (user == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress();
uint256 pendingReward = _calculatePendingRewards(user);
if (pendingReward == 0) revert InsufficientBalance();
userRewards[user] = totalDistributed;
raacToken.safeTransfer(user, pendingReward);
emit RewardClaimed(user, pendingReward);
return pendingReward;
}
function _calculatePendingRewards(address user) internal view returns (uint256) {
uint256 userVotingPower = veRAACToken.getVotingPower(user);
if (userVotingPower == 0) return 0;
uint256 totalVotingPower = veRAACToken.getTotalVotingPower();
if (totalVotingPower == 0) return 0;
uint256 share = (totalDistributed * userVotingPower) / totalVotingPower;
return share > userRewards[user] ? share - userRewards[user] : 0;
}
In the claimRewards function, the userRewards[user] is set to totalDistributed after the user claims their rewards. The _calculatePendingRewards function calculates pending rewards by determining the user’s share of totalDistributed based on their voting power. Since share is always less than or equal to totalDistributed, the condition share > userRewards[user] becomes difficult to satisfy after the initial claim, preventing users from claiming subsequent rewards.
Impact
The user might not be able to get the reward they should have after the claiming the reward once.
Tools Used
Manual review
Recommendations
function claimRewards(address user) external override nonReentrant whenNotPaused returns (uint256) {
if (user == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress();
uint256 pendingReward = _calculatePendingRewards(user);
if (pendingReward == 0) revert InsufficientBalance();
// Reset user rewards before transfer
- userRewards[user] = totalDistributed;
+ userRewards[user] = pendingReward;
// Transfer rewards
raacToken.safeTransfer(user, pendingReward);
emit RewardClaimed(user, pendingReward);
return pendingReward;
}