Increases to raac rewards can be exploited for no risk, diverting rewards away from legitimate stakers.
The structure of calcluateRaacRewards leaves front running a likely possibility.
Rewards are dependent upon the proportion of the total deposits a user's deposits consist of. Also, there is no requirement for minimum deposit length of time. As a result a user deposits through StabilityPool::deposit
This then calls StabilityPool::_mintRAACRewards
, minting new rewards to the pool.
Immediately after that, a user could call withdraw, seizing rewards for no risk to themselves, and also, they will have provided no liquidity for the protocol, extracting rewards despite taking no risk and providing no value.
Note this attack could be amplified in magnitude through the use of a flash loan.
Rewards are misallocated towards exploitative users away from innocent users.
Manual review
Implement a reward system dependent upon time deposited
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