Core Contracts
Regnum Aurum Acquisition Corp
HardhatReal World AssetsNFT
77,280 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

DoS of Funds in `emergencyRevoke` due to incorrect address

holydevoti0n

Summary

The emergencyRevoke function in the RAACReleaseOrchestrator contract contains a critical flaw where it attempts to transfer tokens to itself when the tokens are already held by the contract, effectively creating a redundant transfer that could lead to accounting issues.

Vulnerability Details

The vulnerability lies in the following code snippet:

function emergencyRevoke(address beneficiary) external onlyRole(EMERGENCY_ROLE) {
VestingSchedule storage schedule = vestingSchedules[beneficiary];
if (!schedule.initialized) revert NoVestingSchedule();
uint256 unreleasedAmount = schedule.totalAmount - schedule.releasedAmount;
delete vestingSchedules[beneficiary];
if (unreleasedAmount > 0) {
// @audit-issue - attempting to transfer tokens to itself instead of
// beneficiary
raacToken.transfer(address(this), unreleasedAmount);
emit EmergencyWithdraw(beneficiary, unreleasedAmount);
}
emit VestingScheduleRevoked(beneficiary);
}

The issue occurs because:

  1. The contract already holds the vested tokens in its balance

  2. The function attempts to transfer these tokens to itself using raacToken.transfer(address(this),unreleasedAmount)

Impact

DoS. It is not possible to make an emergencyRevokeas the funds are not sent to the beneficiary.

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommendations

Send the tokens to the beneficiary.

function emergencyRevoke(address beneficiary) external onlyRole(EMERGENCY_ROLE) {
VestingSchedule storage schedule = vestingSchedules[beneficiary];
if (!schedule.initialized) revert NoVestingSchedule();
uint256 unreleasedAmount = schedule.totalAmount - schedule.releasedAmount;
delete vestingSchedules[beneficiary];
if (unreleasedAmount > 0) {
- raacToken.transfer(address(this), unreleasedAmount);
+ raacToken.transfer(beneficiary, unreleasedAmount);
emit EmergencyWithdraw(beneficiary, unreleasedAmount);
}
emit VestingScheduleRevoked(beneficiary);
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

inallhonesty Lead Judge about 1 month ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

RAACReleaseOrchestrator::emergencyRevoke sends revoked tokens to contract address with no withdrawal mechanism, permanently locking funds

inallhonesty Lead Judge about 1 month ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

RAACReleaseOrchestrator::emergencyRevoke sends revoked tokens to contract address with no withdrawal mechanism, permanently locking funds

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