Core Contracts

Regnum Aurum Acquisition Corp
HardhatReal World AssetsNFT
77,280 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Users will not be able to withdraw their extra tokens which they are eligible to take due to increase in liquidity index.

Summary

Users will not be able to withdraw their extra tokens which they are eligible to take due to increase in liquidity index.

Vulnerability Details

When user calls the withdraw function following is the function flow

function withdraw(uint256 amount) external nonReentrant whenNotPaused onlyValidAmount(amount) {
if (withdrawalsPaused) revert WithdrawalsArePaused();
// Update the reserve state before the withdrawal
ReserveLibrary.updateReserveState(reserve, rateData);
// Ensure sufficient liquidity is available
_ensureLiquidity(amount);
// Perform the withdrawal through ReserveLibrary
(uint256 amountWithdrawn, uint256 amountScaled, uint256 amountUnderlying) = ReserveLibrary.withdraw(
reserve, // ReserveData storage
rateData, // ReserveRateData storage
amount, // Amount to withdraw
msg.sender // Recipient
);
// Rebalance liquidity after withdrawal
_rebalanceLiquidity();
emit Withdraw(msg.sender, amountWithdrawn);
}

Reserve library withdraw function is as follows

function withdraw(
ReserveData storage reserve,
ReserveRateData storage rateData,
uint256 amount,
address recipient
) internal returns (uint256 amountWithdrawn, uint256 amountScaled, uint256 amountUnderlying) {
if (amount < 1) revert InvalidAmount();
// Update the reserve interests
updateReserveInterests(reserve, rateData);
// Burn RToken from the recipient - will send underlying asset to the recipient
(uint256 burnedScaledAmount, uint256 newTotalSupply, uint256 amountUnderlying) = IRToken(reserve.reserveRTokenAddress).burn(
recipient, // from
recipient, // receiverOfUnderlying
amount, // amount
reserve.liquidityIndex // index
);
amountWithdrawn = burnedScaledAmount;
// Update the total liquidity and interest rates
updateInterestRatesAndLiquidity(reserve, rateData, 0, amountUnderlying);
emit Withdraw(recipient, amountUnderlying, burnedScaledAmount);
return (amountUnderlying, burnedScaledAmount, amountUnderlying);
}

Rtoken burn function is as follows

function burn(
address from,
address receiverOfUnderlying,
uint256 amount,
uint256 index
) external override onlyReservePool returns (uint256, uint256, uint256) {
if (amount == 0) {
return (0, totalSupply(), 0);
}
uint256 userBalance = balanceOf(from);
_userState[from].index = index.toUint128();
if(amount > userBalance){
amount = userBalance;
}
uint256 amountScaled = amount.rayMul(index);
_userState[from].index = index.toUint128();
_burn(from, amount.toUint128());
if (receiverOfUnderlying != address(this)) {
IERC20(_assetAddress).safeTransfer(receiverOfUnderlying, amount);
}
emit Burn(from, receiverOfUnderlying, amount, index);
return (amount, totalSupply(), amount);
}

Suppose initially a user deposited 100 tokens when liquidity index was 50 . therefore according to the following mint function he will receive 100 r tokens

function mint(
address caller,
address onBehalfOf,
uint256 amountToMint,
uint256 index
) external override onlyReservePool returns (bool, uint256, uint256, uint256) {
if (amountToMint == 0) {
return (false, 0, 0, 0);
}
uint256 amountScaled = amountToMint.rayDiv(index);
if (amountScaled == 0) revert InvalidAmount();
uint256 scaledBalance = balanceOf(onBehalfOf);
bool isFirstMint = scaledBalance == 0;
uint256 balanceIncrease = 0;
if (_userState[onBehalfOf].index != 0 && _userState[onBehalfOf].index < index) {
balanceIncrease = scaledBalance.rayMul(index) - scaledBalance.rayMul(_userState[onBehalfOf].index);
}
_userState[onBehalfOf].index = index.toUint128();
_mint(onBehalfOf, amountToMint.toUint128());
emit Mint(caller, onBehalfOf, amountToMint, index);
return (isFirstMint, amountToMint, totalSupply(), amountScaled);
}

Now suppose liquidity index is equal to 60. And user now wants to withdraw his whole balance.

User balance will be balanceof(user) which is calcualted as follows

function balanceOf(address account) public view override(ERC20, IERC20) returns (uint256) {
uint256 scaledBalance = super.balanceOf(account);
return scaledBalance.rayMul(ILendingPool(_reservePool).getNormalizedIncome());
}

as liquidity index is 60 now therefore the user balance = 100*60 = 6000 tokens.

Now he calls withdraw function which calls the burn function in rtoken contract

function burn(
address from,
address receiverOfUnderlying,
uint256 amount,
uint256 index
) external override onlyReservePool returns (uint256, uint256, uint256) {
if (amount == 0) {
return (0, totalSupply(), 0);
}
uint256 userBalance = balanceOf(from);
_userState[from].index = index.toUint128();
if(amount > userBalance){
amount = userBalance;
}
uint256 amountScaled = amount.rayMul(index);
_userState[from].index = index.toUint128();
_burn(from, amount.toUint128());
if (receiverOfUnderlying != address(this)) {
IERC20(_assetAddress).safeTransfer(receiverOfUnderlying, amount);
}
emit Burn(from, receiverOfUnderlying, amount, index);
return (amount, totalSupply(), amount);
}

Now as can be seen _burn burns amount = userbalance which will be 6000 rtokens but the user doesn't have this much tokens minted to them because initially only 100 tokens were minted to the user. Due to this the user won't be able to receive their legitimate share of tokens back.

Impact

Users can not get back their legitimate tokens back.

Tools Used

Manual review

Recommendations

First mint the extra tokens to the user due to increase in the liquidity index and then burn those tokens .

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

inallhonesty Lead Judge 7 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

DebtToken::mint miscalculates debt by applying interest twice, inflating borrow amounts and risking premature liquidations

RToken::burn incorrectly burns amount (asset units) instead of amountScaled (token units), breaking token economics and interest-accrual mechanism

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