Summary
When a user claims a reward, userRewards[user] is updated to totalDistributed. This is completely incorrect, because totalDistributed is the total amount to be distributed to all users. As a result, the amount that the user can claim in the future will be much less than expected.
Vulnerability Details
When a user claims a reward, userRewards[user] is updated to totalDistributed. This is completely incorrect, because totalDistributed is the total amount to be distributed to all users.
https://github.com/Cyfrin/2025-02-raac/blob/main/contracts/core/collectors/FeeCollector.sol#L199-L213
function claimRewards(address user) external override nonReentrant whenNotPaused returns (uint256) {
if (user == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress();
uint256 pendingReward = _calculatePendingRewards(user);
if (pendingReward == 0) revert InsufficientBalance();
@> userRewards[user] = totalDistributed;
raacToken.safeTransfer(user, pendingReward);
emit RewardClaimed(user, pendingReward);
return pendingReward;
}
userRewards[user] is used to calculate the pending amount of rewards for the user.
https://github.com/Cyfrin/2025-02-raac/blob/main/contracts/core/collectors/FeeCollector.sol#L479-L488
function _calculatePendingRewards(address user) internal view returns (uint256) {
uint256 userVotingPower = veRAACToken.getVotingPower(user);
if (userVotingPower == 0) return 0;
uint256 totalVotingPower = veRAACToken.getTotalVotingPower();
if (totalVotingPower == 0) return 0;
uint256 share = (totalDistributed * userVotingPower) / totalVotingPower;
@> return share > userRewards[user] ? share - userRewards[user] : 0;
}
As a result, the amount that the user can claim from the next time will be much less than expected.
Impact
The amount that the user can claim from the next time will be much less than expected.
Recommendations
function claimRewards(address user) external override nonReentrant whenNotPaused returns (uint256) {
if (user == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress();
uint256 pendingReward = _calculatePendingRewards(user);
if (pendingReward == 0) revert InsufficientBalance();
// Reset user rewards before transfer
- userRewards[user] = totalDistributed;
+ userRewards[user] += pendingReward;
// Transfer rewards
raacToken.safeTransfer(user, pendingReward);
emit RewardClaimed(user, pendingReward);
return pendingReward;
}