Submission Details
Severity:
Missing Checkpoint Reset in veRAACToken.emergencyWithdraw()
Description
The emergencyWithdraw() function does not call _checkpointState.writeCheckpoint(msg.sender, 0);, which results in stale voting power being retained even after full withdrawal. This discrepancy can lead to governance miscalculations where users who no longer have locked tokens still retain influence.
Recommendations
function emergencyWithdraw() external nonReentrant {
if (emergencyWithdrawDelay == 0 || block.timestamp < emergencyWithdrawDelay)
revert EmergencyWithdrawNotEnabled();
LockManager.Lock memory userLock = _lockState.locks[msg.sender];
if (userLock.amount == 0) revert NoTokensLocked();
uint256 amount = userLock.amount;
uint256 currentPower = balanceOf(msg.sender);
delete _lockState.locks[msg.sender];
delete _votingState.points[msg.sender];
+ // Update checkpoints
+ _checkpointState.writeCheckpoint(msg.sender, 0);
_burn(msg.sender, currentPower);
raacToken.safeTransfer(msg.sender, amount);
emit EmergencyWithdrawn(msg.sender, amount);
}
Updates
Lead Judging Commences
inallhonesty 2 months ago
Submission Judgement Published Assigned finding tags:
veRAACToken::emergencyWithdraw doesn't update checkpoint - innacurate historical voting power, inconsistent state
Prize pool breakdown
Total prize
77,280 USDC
nSLOC
3,86420 USDC / LOC
74,000
3,280
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