Submission Details
Severity:
User can delegate infinite boost amount
Summary
User can delegate infinite boost amount to multiple addresses.
Vulnerability Details
Users can delegate their boost to another address. The issue is user's boost amount is not decreased after delegation, and user can delegate his boost to multiple addresses he owns.
if (to == address(0)) revert InvalidPool();
if (amount == 0) revert InvalidBoostAmount();
if (duration < MIN_DELEGATION_DURATION || duration > MAX_DELEGATION_DURATION)
revert InvalidDelegationDuration();
uint256 userBalance = IERC20(address(veToken)).balanceOf(msg.sender);
if (userBalance < amount) revert InsufficientVeBalance();
UserBoost storage delegation = userBoosts[msg.sender][to];
if (delegation.amount > 0) revert BoostAlreadyDelegated();
delegation.amount = amount;
delegation.expiry = block.timestamp + duration;
delegation.delegatedTo = to;
delegation.lastUpdateTime = block.timestamp;
emit BoostDelegated(msg.sender, to, amount, duration);
Impact
User can delegate infinite boost amount.
Tools Used
Manual review.
Recommendations
Recommended to decrease delegator's boost according to delegated amount.
Updates
Lead Judging Commences
inallhonesty 7 months ago
Submission Judgement Published Assigned finding tags:
BoostController::delegateBoost lacks total delegation tracking, allowing users to delegate the same veTokens multiple times to different pools for amplified influence and rewards
Prize pool breakdown
Total prize
77,280 USDC
nSLOC
3,86420
USDC / LOC
74,000
3,280
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