Core Contracts

Regnum Aurum Acquisition Corp
HardhatReal World AssetsNFT
77,280 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

`StabilityPool.liquidateBorrower()` calculates `userDebt` incorrectly

Summary

The StabilityPool.liquidateBorrower() function covers user's debt. However, it calculates user debt incorrectly and uses inflated value for user debt.

Vulnerability Details

The StabilityPool.liquidateBorrower() function calculates the amount of user debt by invoking lendingPool.getUserDebt(userAddress).

The lendingPool.getUserDebt(userAddress) function returns normalized amount of debt, by multiplying user.scaledDebtBalance by reserve.usageIndex. However, StabilityPool.liquidateBorrower() function mutiplies this value by reserve.usageIndex again.

As result, userDebt will be scaledAmount * reserve.usageIndex ^ 2 and be inflated. The stability pool will use inflated assets to cover user's debt.

function liquidateBorrower(address userAddress) external onlyManagerOrOwner nonReentrant whenNotPaused {
_update();
// Get the user's debt from the LendingPool.
uint256 userDebt = lendingPool.getUserDebt(userAddress);
@> uint256 scaledUserDebt = WadRayMath.rayMul(userDebt, lendingPool.getNormalizedDebt());
if (userDebt == 0) revert InvalidAmount();
uint256 crvUSDBalance = crvUSDToken.balanceOf(address(this));
if (crvUSDBalance < scaledUserDebt) revert InsufficientBalance();
// Approve the LendingPool to transfer the debt amount
bool approveSuccess = crvUSDToken.approve(address(lendingPool), scaledUserDebt);
if (!approveSuccess) revert ApprovalFailed();
// Update lending pool state before liquidation
lendingPool.updateState();
// Call finalizeLiquidation on LendingPool
lendingPool.finalizeLiquidation(userAddress);
emit BorrowerLiquidated(userAddress, scaledUserDebt);
}
function getUserDebt(address userAddress) public view returns (uint256) {
UserData storage user = userData[userAddress];
>> return user.scaledDebtBalance.rayMul(reserve.usageIndex);
}

Impact

The stability pool uses inflated assets to liquidate user debt.

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommendations

Remove multiplication by reserve.usageIndex

function liquidateBorrower(address userAddress) external onlyManagerOrOwner nonReentrant whenNotPaused {
_update();
// Get the user's debt from the LendingPool.
uint256 userDebt = lendingPool.getUserDebt(userAddress);
- uint256 scaledUserDebt = WadRayMath.rayMul(userDebt, lendingPool.getNormalizedDebt());
if (userDebt == 0) revert InvalidAmount();
uint256 crvUSDBalance = crvUSDToken.balanceOf(address(this));
- if (crvUSDBalance < scaledUserDebt) revert InsufficientBalance();
+ if (crvUSDBalance < userDebt) revert InsufficientBalance();
// Approve the LendingPool to transfer the debt amount
- bool approveSuccess = crvUSDToken.approve(address(lendingPool), scaledUserDebt);
+ bool approveSuccess = crvUSDToken.approve(address(lendingPool), userDebt);
if (!approveSuccess) revert ApprovalFailed();
// Update lending pool state before liquidation
lendingPool.updateState();
// Call finalizeLiquidation on LendingPool
lendingPool.finalizeLiquidation(userAddress);
- emit BorrowerLiquidated(userAddress, scaledUserDebt);
+ emit BorrowerLiquidated(userAddress, userDebt);
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

inallhonesty Lead Judge 7 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

StabilityPool::liquidateBorrower double-scales debt by multiplying already-scaled userDebt with usage index again, causing liquidations to fail

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