Missing Timestamp Validation
Summary
The update_price function accepts future timestamps (_ts), corrupting price calculations.
Vulnerability Details
ScrvusdOracleV2.vy
In update_price, the _ts is not checked against the current time. A malicious prover could submit a future timestamp, making price_params_ts incorrect. Need to add require(_ts <= block.timestamp).
If _ts is future, the price_params_ts would be incorrect. That could allow a prover to submit future timestamps, affecting price calculations
Impact
Low:
Provers can submit future timestamps, distorting historical price data.
Tools Used
Recommendations
Add validation:
Lead Judging Commences
[invalid] finding-missing-proof-content-validation
- See [here]([https://github.com/CodeHawks-Contests/2025-03-curve?tab=readme-ov-file#blockhash-oracle)](https://github.com/CodeHawks-Contests/2025-03-curve?tab=readme-ov-file#blockhash-oracle) on how it is used to verify storage variable - All state roots and proofs must be verified by the OOS `StateProofVerifier` inherited as `Verifier` (where the price values and params are extracted), so there is no proof that manipulating timestamp/inputs can affect a price update - It is assumed that the OOS prover will provide accurate data and the OOS verifier will verify the prices/max unlock time to be within an appropriate bound/values - There is a account existance check in L96 of `ScrvusdVerifierV1.sol`, in which the params for price updates are extracted from
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