Unbounded Block Number in Updates
Summary
No upper bound check for _block_number in update_price().
Vulnerability Details
A maliciously large _block_number could temporarily block price updates.
Impact
Temporary denial-of-service for oracle updates.
Tools Used
Code audit of assert self.last_block_number <= _block_number.
Recommendations
Limit future block look-ahead:
Lead Judging Commences
[invalid] finding-missing-proof-content-validation
- See [here]([https://github.com/CodeHawks-Contests/2025-03-curve?tab=readme-ov-file#blockhash-oracle)](https://github.com/CodeHawks-Contests/2025-03-curve?tab=readme-ov-file#blockhash-oracle) on how it is used to verify storage variable - All state roots and proofs must be verified by the OOS `StateProofVerifier` inherited as `Verifier` (where the price values and params are extracted), so there is no proof that manipulating timestamp/inputs can affect a price update - It is assumed that the OOS prover will provide accurate data and the OOS verifier will verify the prices/max unlock time to be within an appropriate bound/values - There is a account existance check in L96 of `ScrvusdVerifierV1.sol`, in which the params for price updates are extracted from
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