The verifyScrvusdByStateRoot function in ScrvusdVerifierV1 trusts the blockhash oracle’s state root without validation, unlike verifyScrvusdByBlockHash. This partial mitigation relies on oracle reliability, leaving a gap if it fails.
The vulnerable code is in verifyScrvusdByStateRoot:
Blind Trust: No check against blockhash, unlike:
PoC
Objective
Feed a fake state root via a compromised blockhash oracle to misprice scrvUSD.
Prerequisites
Deployed ScrvusdVerifierV1 with a mock IBlockHashOracle.
Control over the oracle’s state root return value (test setup).
Exploit Scenario
An attacker uses a rigged blockhash oracle to supply a fake state root, passing invalid parameters.
Proof of Concept Steps
Mock Oracle:
solidity
Setup: Deploy ScrvusdVerifierV1 with MockBlockHashOracle.
Exploit:
Craft a proof matching the fake state root 0xdead with skewed parameters (e.g., total_debt = 1000000).
Call verifyScrvusdByStateRoot(blockNumber, proof_rlp).
Result: Oracle updates with inflated price, exploitable in pools.
Outcome
Proves reliance on oracle trust can lead to catastrophic mispricing.
Notes
These PoCs assume testnet control (e.g., role access, mock dependencies). In a live environment, exploits depend on compromising roles or oracles.
For a real contest, you’d deploy these on a fork (e.g., Foundry/Anvil) and log results (e.g., price changes, reverts).
Garbage Data: Incorrect state root feeds invalid parameters, mispricing scrvUSD.
Pool Exploit: Temporary mispricing could drain pools.
Manual Review
Cross-verify state root with blockhash in verifyScrvusdByStateRoot (requires block header input):
- Anything related to the output by the `BLOCK_HASH_ORACLE` is OOS per \[docs here]\(<https://github.com/CodeHawks-Contests/2025-03-curve?tab=readme-ov-file#blockhash-oracle>). - The PoC utilizes a mock `BLOCK_HASH_ORACLE`which is not representative of the one used by the protocol - Even when block hash returned is incorrect, the assumption is already explicitly made known in the docs, and the contract allows a subsequent update within the same block to update and correct prices - All state roots and proofs must be verified by the OOS `StateProofVerifier` inherited as `Verifier`, so there is no proof that manipulating block timestamp/block number/inputs can affect a price update - There seems to be a lot of confusion on the block hash check. The block hash check is a unique identifier of a block and has nothing to do with the state root. All value verifications is performed by the OOS Verifier contract as mentioned above
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