RustFund

First Flight #36
Beginner FriendlyRust
100 EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

Unclaimed rent from fund and contribution accounts leads to permanent SOL lockup

Summary

neither the withdraw() nor refund() functions properly close their respective accounts after the funds have been transferred. This results in the rent amount (the SOL required to keep the account allocated on the Solana blockchain) remaining locked in these accounts indefinitely.

Vulnerability Details

In Solana, accounts must maintain a minimum balance to remain "rent-exempt", ensuring they aren't purged from the blockchain. When accounts are no longer needed, best practice is to close them and return this rent to the appropriate party (typically the account creator). The RustFund protocol currently lacks this account cleanup mechanism.

  • The withdrawal process in withdraw() transfers the raised funds from the fund account to the creator

  • Similarly, the refund process in refund() transfers the contribution amount back to the contributor and resets the contribution amount

In both functions, the account data is updated, but the accounts themselves remain open, with their rent amount locked. After all funds have been withdrawn or refunded, these accounts serve no further purpose but continue to consume blockchain resources and lock up SOL.

Proof of Concept

  1. Alice creates a fund with a goal of 100 SOL, which requires 0.1 SOL as rent for the fund account.

  2. The fund successfully raises 100 SOL from various contributors, each of whom also paid rent for their contribution accounts (approximately 0.05 SOL each).

  3. Alice calls withdraw() to claim the 100 SOL raised funds, but the fund account itself is not closed.

  4. The 0.1 SOL rent for the fund account remains locked in the account indefinitely.

  5. Similarly, when contributors request refunds through the refund() function, their contribution accounts are updated but not closed.

  6. The rent for all contribution accounts (e.g., 10 contributors × 0.05 SOL = 0.5 SOL) remains locked indefinitely.

  7. Over time, as more funds are created and more contributions are made, the amount of permanently locked SOL grows.

Impact

  • Economic Inefficiency,

  • Blockchain bloat,

  • Reduced user returns

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommendations

Implement proper account closure in both the withdraw() and refund() functions.

Updates

Appeal created

bube Lead Judge 3 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

Accounts are not closed after withdraw and refund

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