Description
The refund and withdraw functions directly manipulate lamports (SOL) using try_borrow_mut_lamports(), bypassing Solana’s native system_program::transfer logic. This approach is error-prone and violates best practices for handling SOL transfers.
Impact
- Fund Loss: Incorrect lamport arithmetic (e.g., underflow/overflow) can corrupt balances. 
- Reentrancy Risks: Manual lamport updates lack atomicity, opening vectors for exploits. 
- Protocol Instability: Direct manipulation bypasses system-level security checks. 
Affected Code
**ctx.accounts.fund.to_account_info().try_borrow_mut_lamports()? =  
    ctx.accounts.fund.lamports().checked_sub(amount)?;  
**ctx.accounts.contributor.to_account_info().try_borrow_mut_lamports()? =  
    ctx.accounts.contributor.lamports().checked_add(amount)?;  
**ctx.accounts.fund.to_account_info().try_borrow_mut_lamports()? =  
    ctx.accounts.fund.lamports().checked_sub(amount)?;  
**ctx.accounts.creator.to_account_info().try_borrow_mut_lamports()? =  
    ctx.accounts.creator.lamports().checked_add(amount)?;  
Recommendation
Replace manual lamport updates with system_program::transfer for secure SOL movements:
For refund():
let cpi_context = CpiContext::new(  
    ctx.accounts.system_program.to_account_info(),  
    system_program::Transfer {  
        from: ctx.accounts.fund.to_account_info(),  
        to: ctx.accounts.contributor.to_account_info(),  
    },  
);  
system_program::transfer(cpi_context, amount)?;  
For withdraw():
let cpi_context = CpiContext::new(  
    ctx.accounts.system_program.to_account_info(),  
    system_program::Transfer {  
        from: ctx.accounts.fund.to_account_info(),  
        to: ctx.accounts.creator.to_account_info(),  
    },  
);  
system_program::transfer(cpi_context, amount)?;