Summary
The contract deducts lamports during refunds but doesn't reduce the amount_raised
counter, creating a discrepancy between actual funds and displayed totals.
Vulnerability Details
The fund.amount_raised
field acts as a deposit counter but never decreases, while real funds are reduced via lamport transfers.
https://github.com/CodeHawks-Contests/2025-03-rustfund/blob/b5dd7b0ec01471667ae3a02520701aae405ac857/programs/rustfund/src/lib.rs#L66-L88
pub fn refund(ctx: Context<FundRefund>) -> Result<()> {
let amount = ctx.accounts.contribution.amount;
if ctx.accounts.fund.deadline != 0 && ctx.accounts.fund.deadline > Clock::get().unwrap().unix_timestamp.try_into().unwrap() {
return Err(ErrorCode::DeadlineNotReached.into());
}
**ctx.accounts.fund.to_account_info().try_borrow_mut_lamports()? =
ctx.accounts.fund.to_account_info().lamports()
.checked_sub(amount)
.ok_or(ProgramError::InsufficientFunds)?;
**ctx.accounts.contributor.to_account_info().try_borrow_mut_lamports()? =
ctx.accounts.contributor.to_account_info().lamports()
.checked_add(amount)
.ok_or(ErrorCode::CalculationOverflow)?;
ctx.accounts.contribution.amount = 0;
Ok(())
}
Impact
Withdrawal Failures: Creators may attempt withdrawals exceeding actual balances.
False Progress: Funding goals appear closer to completion than reality.
Trust Erosion: Users see inflated totals that don't match blockchain reality.
Tools Used
Recommendations
Add to refund() after lamport transfer
let fund = &mut ctx.accounts.fund;
fund.amount_raised = fund.amount_raised
.checked_sub(amount)
.ok_or(ErrorCode::CalculationOverflow)?;
Add validation in withdraw()