The specific issue is that both the owner and organizer roles are controlled by single addresses. This creates a severe centralization risk where a compromise of either private key grants an attacker extensive and immediate control over the contract's critical functions and funds.
function setOrganizer(address _organizer) public @>onlyOwner {
require(_organizer != address(0), "Organizer cannot be zero address");
organizer = _organizer;
emit OrganizerSet(_organizer);
}
function withdraw(address target) external @>onlyOwner {
require(target != address(0), "Target address cannot be zero");
(bool success, ) = target.call{value: address(this).balance}("");
require(success, "Failed to withdraw Ether");
emit EtherWithdrawn(target, address(this).balance);
}
function configurePass(
uint256 passType,
uint256 price,
uint256 maxSupply
) external @>onlyOrganizer {
require(price > 0, "Price must be greater than zero");
passConfigs[passType].price = price;
passConfigs[passType].maxSupply = maxSupply;
passConfigs[passType].passSupply = 0;
emit PassConfigured(passType, price, maxSupply);
}
function createPerformance(
string memory name,
uint256 startTime,
uint256 endTime,
uint256 baseReward
) external @>onlyOrganizer returns (uint256) {
}
function createMemorabiliaCollection(
string memory name,
string memory baseUri,
uint256 priceInBeat,
uint256 maxSupply
) external @>onlyOrganizer returns (uint256) {
}
A simplified scenario demonstrating the immediate impact of a compromised owner key:
- // Current structure relying on single-address control:
- contract FestivalPass is ERC1155, Ownable2Step, IFestivalPass {
- address public organizer; // Single EOA
- // ... other contract logic
- }
+ // Proposed structure using Multi-Signature and Timelock for critical roles/functions:
+ // (Requires external Multi-Sig and Timelock contracts, e.g., Safe Wallet and OpenZeppelin TimelockController)
+ interface IMultisig {
+ function submitTransaction(address destination, uint256 value, bytes calldata data) external returns (uint256 transactionId);
+ function confirmTransaction(uint256 transactionId) external;
+ function executeTransaction(uint256 transactionId) external;
+ }
+ interface ITimelock {
+ function schedule(address target, uint256 value, bytes calldata data, bytes32 predecessor, bytes32 salt, uint256 delay) external returns (bytes32 id);
+ function execute(address target, uint256 value, bytes calldata data, bytes32 predecessor, bytes32 salt) external returns (bytes32 id);
+ }
+ contract FestivalPass is ERC1155, Ownable2Step, IFestivalPass {
+ // The 'owner' and 'organizer' should now be multi-sig contract addresses
+ // The `owner` of this contract (via Ownable2Step) would be the TimelockController
+ // The `organizer` could be a separate Multi-Sig
+ address public immutable ORGANIZER_MULTISIG; // Set at construction
+ // This contract's owner would be the TimelockController address
+ constructor(address _organizerMultisig) {
+ ORGANIZER_MULTISIG = _organizerMultisig;
+ }
+ // Update setOrganizer to be called by the Timelock (owner of this contract)
+ // The Timelock's admin would propose this change via Multi-Sig.
- function setOrganizer(address _organizer) public onlyOwner {
+ function setOrganizer(address _newOrganizer) public onlyOwner { // onlyOwner is now Timelock
+ require(_newOrganizer != address(0), "Organizer cannot be zero address");
+ // The actual `organizer` state variable should ideally be managed via the new `ORGANIZER_MULTISIG`
+ emit OrganizerSet(_newOrganizer);
+ }
+ // Modify withdraw to be callable only by the Timelock,
+ // which requires a delay and prior scheduling from its own admin (Multi-Sig).
- function withdraw(address target) external onlyOwner {
+ function withdraw(address target) external onlyOwner { // onlyOwner is now Timelock
+ require(target != address(0), "Target address cannot be zero");
+ (bool success, ) = target.call{value: address(this).balance}("");
+ require(success, "Failed to withdraw Ether");
+ emit EtherWithdrawn(target, address(this).balance);
+ }
// Modify `onlyOrganizer` modifier to use the `ORGANIZER_MULTISIG` address
- modifier onlyOrganizer() {
- require(msg.sender == organizer, "Caller is not the organizer");
+ modifier onlyOrganizer() { // This modifier now points to the Multi-Sig
+ require(msg.sender == ORGANIZER_MULTISIG, "Caller is not the designated organizer multisig");
_;
}
+ // All functions previously protected by onlyOrganizer are now effectively
+ // controlled by the `ORGANIZER_MULTISIG` which requires multiple approvals.
- function configurePass(
- uint256 passType,
- uint256 price,
- uint256 maxSupply
- ) external onlyOrganizer {
+ function configurePass(
+ uint256 passType,
+ uint256 price,
+ uint256 maxSupply
+ ) external onlyOrganizer { // This now requires multi-sig approval
+ require(price > 0, "Price must be greater than zero");
+ passConfigs[passType].price = price;
+ passConfigs[passType].maxSupply = maxSupply;
+ passConfigs[passType].passSupply = 0;
+ emit PassConfigured(passType, price, maxSupply);
+ }
+ // Similar changes apply to createPerformance and createMemorabiliaCollection.
}
Switching to multi-signature control for important roles and adding timelocks for crucial actions will greatly improve the contract's security, bringing it more in line with decentralized best practices.
