Root + Impact

The root cause lies in the presence of a previousKingPayout variable in claimThrone() that is never assigned any non-zero value. The logic surrounding it suggests the previous king should receive part of the next claim fee — as stated in documentation — but no actual payout ever occurs:

Receives a small payout from the next player's claimFee (if applicable).

The impact is twofold: (1) the platform fee calculation includes a defensive check involving a meaningless variable, and (2) players are misled into thinking they will receive payouts as the previous king, when in fact they receive nothing.

Description

• The contract defines a previousKingPayout and references it in fee calculations, but it is never assigned or transferred to the previous king.

• This creates misleading expectations for players and leaves dead logic that serves no purpose.

Risk

Likelihood:

The likehood is High because:

• Always active; previousKingPayout is permanently set to 0.

• Code executes on every claimThrone() call but has no real effect.

Impact:

The impact is Low because the issue:

• Misleads users who expect payouts as per the documentation.

• Introduces unnecessary code complexity and false safety checks.

Proof of Concept

None.

Recommended Mitigation

If previous king payouts are intended:

If not intended, simplify the logic: