Logical inversion in `require(msg.sender == currentKing)` (should be `!=`) restricts throne claiming *exclusively* to the current king, permanently freezing the game state by blocking all challenges and rendering the core mechanic inoperable.

The function `Game::claimThrone` includes a validation check intended to prevent the current king from re-claiming the throne. However, the condition is implemented in a logically inverted manner. As currently written, the require statement allows the call to proceed only if the sender is the current king, which contradicts the intended access control. This effectively restricts the function to be callable exclusively by the current king, while blocking all other players from claiming the throne. Consequently, the game mechanism is broken, as no new player can ever claim the throne or challenge the current king, rendering the core functionality inoperable.

You can add this in `Game.t.sol` and i created function called `getCurrentKing()` return the address for current king

<details>

<summary>PoC</summary>

​

```solidity

function testKingOnlyCanCallclaimThrone() public {

console2.log("current King: ", game.getCurrentKing());

address king = game.getCurrentKing();

vm.deal(king, 10 ether);

vm.prank(king);

game.claimThrone{value: 5 ether}();

​

vm.prank(player1);

vm.expectRevert("Game: You are already the king. No need to re-claim.");

game.claimThrone{value: 5 ether}();

}

```

​

</details>

Modify the condition