Submission Details
Severity:
`currentKing` check in `Game::claimThrone()` doesn't allow anyone to call the function
Description
The check to see whether the caller is currentKing or not in claimThrone() is wrong as it only allows zero address to call it instead of the other way around.
Impact
Not a single user can participate in the game at all. This check makes the contract unusable, it is DoSing itself.
PoC
function claimThrone() external payable gameNotEnded nonReentrant {
require(msg.value >= claimFee, "Game: Insufficient ETH sent to claim the throne.");
@> require(msg.sender == currentKing, "Game: You are already the king. No need to re-claim.");
...
}
As the initial currentKing value is set to address(0) by default, this check only allows address(0) to call it, which is impossible. Even if currentKing is given a valid address value, no one would be able to successfully claim the throne except that initial address.
Mitigation Steps
+ require(msg.sender != currentKing, "Game: You are already the king. No need to re-claim.");
- require(msg.sender == currentKing, "Game: You are already the king. No need to re-claim.");
Updates
Appeal created
inallhonesty 4 months ago
Submission Judgement Published Assigned finding tags:
Game::claimThrone `msg.sender == currentKing` check is busted
Rewards breakdown
nSLOC
181This contest has a flat reward structure with the following payouts:
100 EXP
20 EXP
2 EXP
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