Scope
src/MultiSigTimelock.sol: _getTimelockDelay
Normal behavior: NO_TIME_DELAY for value < 1 ETH.
Issue: Calls with value == 0 include contract governance operations (e.g., setOwner, upgradeTo) that should be delayed; currently they execute instantly.
Likelihood:
Reason 1 // Most governance calls are 0 ETH
Reason 2 // Multisigs perform upgrades and role changes frequently
Impact:
Impact 1 // Sudden system changes without delay window
Impact 2 // Elevated risk from signer compromise
Explanation: Propose a call to upgradeTo on a proxy with 0 ETH. It executes immediately.
Explanation: Enforce a minimum delay for any transaction with non-empty data.
Status: Valid (Mitigated in src/MultiSigTimelock.sol via H1 fix)
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