The timelock mechanism is designed to enforce delay periods for high-value transactions (1-7 days based on ETH amount) to prevent rushed or compromised transfers.
However, the timelock is calculated from proposedAt (when the transaction is proposed), not from when the quorum of 3 confirmations is reached. This allows the timelock to be completely bypassed by simply delaying the confirmation process.
Likelihood:
Attackers or colluding signers can intentionally delay confirmations past the timelock period
Natural delays in coordination among signers also trigger this bypass unintentionally
Only requires waiting - no complex attack needed
Impact:
100 ETH+ transactions (meant to have 7-day delay) can be executed immediately after last confirmation
The core security feature of the protocol (timelock protection) is rendered useless
High-value transactions have no meaningful protection against rushed execution
Compromised signers can coordinate to drain funds instantly
Track when quorum is reached and calculate timelock from that point:
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