Neither Stratax nor StrataxOracle implements a pause mechanism. If a vulnerability is being actively exploited, oracle prices become corrupted, or an external dependency behaves unexpectedly, there is no way to stop new positions from being opened or incorrectly unwound.
Likelihood:
DeFi protocols regularly face emergency scenarios where the only protective response is to halt operations
Oracle manipulation, flash loan attacks on dependent protocols, and bridge exploits all create windows requiring emergency halts
Impact:
Owner cannot prevent position creation during an active exploit — attacker continues opening positions with manipulated prices
No ability to freeze oracle price consumption if a Chainlink feed is actively compromised
Inherit from OpenZeppelin's Pausable and add whenNotPaused to createLeveragedPosition and unwindPosition. This gives the owner a single-transaction emergency stop that can halt all new position activity while leaving existing positions intact and withdrawable by other means.
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