Time‑sensitive swaps should include a deadline/expiry so a transaction that lingers in the mempool cannot be executed later at an unfavorable price (e.g., after major market moves or when front‑run/sandwiched). This is a standard MEV/time‑delay protection pattern used across DEXes.
Stratax forwards raw 1inch calldata to _call1InchSwap and only enforces a minReturnAmount. There is no deadline check anywhere in the open/unwind flash‑loan flows. As a result, a transaction can be mined much later than intended and still pass minReturnAmount (which may be loose by necessity), exposing users to stale execution and adverse selection.
Likelihood: Medium
Transactions on public mempools routinely experience delays, re‑ordering, and inclusion uncertainty; during volatile periods, inclusion can happen many blocks later.
Users/integrators may set a generous minReturnAmount to avoid benign reverts, which increases the window for adverse fills when no deadline is enforced.
Impact: Medium
Adverse execution / value loss: A delayed open/unwind may still clear minReturnAmount yet execute at materially worse prices than intended, harming user PnL.
MEV amplification: Lack of expiry enables searchers to keep transactions hanging and include them only when it benefits them (or harms the user).
This shows that without an explicit block‑timestamp gate, stale execution proceeds as long as minReturnAmount is satisfied.
Add an explicit deadline/expiry to both open and unwind flows and enforce it just before the swap (or at the start of each flash‑loan callback). Keep it simple and chain‑agnostic.
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