The protocol's collateral design is intended to bind an economic cost to NFT ownership: collateral is locked at mint time and only returned together with sale proceeds after a genuine purchase, incentivising real transactions.
cancelListing refunds collateralForMinting[tokenId] to the seller at cancellation time, even though the NFT is simultaneously returned to the seller's wallet. A user can therefore execute mint → list → immediate cancel to simultaneously hold both the NFT and the full collateral amount, completely defeating the economic constraint the collateral was designed to impose.
Likelihood:
Minting an NFT, listing it, and immediately cancelling is a fully legitimate user flow that requires no special conditions — any whitelisted user can trigger it at zero marginal cost.
All whitelisted users can exploit this continuously and independently after the protocol launches.
Impact:
The collateral mechanism becomes entirely inoperative, stripping the protocol of its primary economic tool for constraining user behaviour.
Users can repeatedly mint and cancel at no cost, occupying NFT supply and withdrawing the USDC the protocol intended to keep locked.
Add this to 2026-03-NFT-dealers/test/NFTDealersTest.t.sol,run forge test --match-test testPoC_C02_CollateralReturnedOnCancel -vvvv
Remove the collateral refund from cancelListing entirely. Collateral should remain locked for the lifetime of NFT ownership and be returned only through collectUsdcFromSelling after a verified sale.
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
This is your time to appeal against judgements on your submissions.
Appeals are being carefully reviewed by our judges.
The contest is complete and the rewards are being distributed.