The Noir circuit is designed to let a finder prove knowledge of any one of the 10 intended treasures without revealing which one it is. It does this by checking that the public treasure_hash is present in the hardcoded ALLOWED_TREASURE_HASHES array and that it equals pedersen_hash(treasure).
The last two entries in ALLOWED_TREASURE_HASHES are identical. The array therefore only contains 9 unique hashes instead of the documented 10. Treasure #9’s hash is missing, so no valid ZK proof can ever be generated for it.
Likelihood:
The array is statically defined in the circuit source and is baked into the deployed verifier contract.
The is_allowed helper and the main function both rely on this exact array; the duplicate is present in every build and every deployment.
Impact:
Treasure #9 becomes permanently unclaimable, even a finder who physically locates it and knows the correct secret cannot generate a valid proof.
The real-world treasure hunt is left with only 9 working treasures instead of the intended 10, breaking the game design and fairness guarantees.
Simply inspecting the array shows ALLOWED_TREASURE_HASHES[8] == ALLOWED_TREASURE_HASHES[9]. Any attempt to claim treasure #9 with its real secret will fail the assert(is_allowed(treasure_hash)) check in main.
Update the array size, loop bounds, all comments that say “10 allowed hashes / 10 treasures”, and the test suite accordingly.
The issue stems from a mismatch between the circuit and the contract’s economic assumptions: the Solidity contract is configured for `MAX_TREASURES = 10` and only allows the owner to call `withdraw()` once `claimsCount >= MAX_TREASURES`, while the Noir circuit’s baked-in `ALLOWED_TREASURE_HASHES` array does not actually contain ten distinct treasures because one hash is duplicated and another expected hash is missing. As a result, under the intended one-claim-per-treasure design described in the README, there are only nine uniquely claimable treasures even though the system is funded and accounted as if ten rewards can be legitimately redeemed. That creates two linked consequences from the same root cause: first, one treasure is effectively unclaimable because no valid proof can ever be generated for the missing allowed hash, and second, the normal “hunt over” withdrawal path becomes bricked because honest participants can never reach ten legitimate unique claims, leaving the post-hunt fund recovery logic via `withdraw` function permanently unreachable. The owner can still intervene through the emergency path.
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
This is your time to appeal against judgements on your submissions.
Appeals are being carefully reviewed by our judges.